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RUNNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT
GAUNTLET ON COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AFTER CITIZENS
UNITED: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
FROM SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE
JOBS ACT
CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, KATHY FOGEL, &
RWAN EL-KHATIB
“The more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.”
1
-Jeremy Bentham
INTRODUCTION
“To require disclosure or not to require disclosure?” That is the
question faced by regulators, including the Securities and Exchange
2
Commission (SEC), in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in

Copyright © 2014 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Kathy Fogel, & Rwan El-Khatib.
 Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law, 1401 61st Street South, Gulfport, FL
33707-3299.
 Associate Professor of Finance, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University, 8 Ashburton
Place, Boston, MA 02108. kfogel@suffolk.edu.
 Assistant Professor of Finance, College of Business, Zayed University, Dubai, UAE.
rwan.elkhatib@zu.ac.ae.
We thank Hien Nguyen and Nicole Fuller for the most capable research assistance. Kathy Fogel
acknowledges financial support from the Public Citizen Foundation, Washington D.C. Professor
Torres-Spelliscy thanks Jared Bernstein, the Director of Congress Watch Lisa Gilbert,
Professors John C. Coates IV, Jennifer S. Taub, Brian Galle, Glynn Torres-Spelliscy for their
helpful feedback on earlier drafts, her Stetson Law research assistants, Adam Labonte,
Christian Moriarty, Laurelyn Schaefer, Kevin Crews, Raphael Rashkin, Cherylin Blitch,
Courtney Chaipel, Alex Farris, and Stetson Law Librarian Sally Waters for their research
assistance, and Stetson University College of Law for the grant to support this research.
1. Jeremy Bentham, Farming Defended, in 1 WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS 276–77
(Michael Quinn ed., Oxford University Press 2001) (1796).
2. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 966 (2011).
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3

Citizens United v. FEC, which allowed for a new free flow of
4
corporate money into the American political system. Since 2011, a
petition by ten law professors asking for transparency of corporate
5
political spending has been pending before the SEC. Over one
million people have written to the SEC asking the Commission to act
6
on this petition.
The political spending of publicly traded corporations is
significant for two reasons: (1) public corporations tend to be larger,
affording them greater potential influence over the political process,
and (2) they tend to have more shareholders whose interests will be
implicated by campaign spending. Here, “political spending” is meant
to encompass all spending in the electoral process, whether directly or
indirectly, and not, unless otherwise noted, disclosure of lobbying
expenses. This article anticipates the SEC’s eventual promulgation of
7
rules requiring disclosure of corporate political spending. Many of
the core questions that we can now study about the market’s reaction
to increased regulation of listed companies are likely to be implicated
in the debate about corporate political spending disclosures.
Corporations that do not want to disclose their political spending
8
are likely to challenge any rule that the SEC issues on the subject.
3. Andrew Joseph, Poll: Most Voters Oppose Citizens United Decision, NAT. J. BLOG
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/influencealley/2012/01/poll-most-votersoppose-citizens-united-decision-20 (“The poll found that 62 percent of all voters oppose the
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision (the two-year anniversary of which is tomorrow) and
46 percent of voters strongly oppose it. Meanwhile, 55 percent of voters do not believe that
corporations should have the same rights as people.”).
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); Nell Minow, Editor & Co-Founder,
The Corporate Library, The Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture to the SEC Historical Society
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/
programs/sechistorical-podcast-031710-transcript.pdf.
5. The ten professors are Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, Jr.,
James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Donald C. Langevoort, and Hillary Sale. Petition for Rulemaking from the Committee on
Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Disclosure Comm. Petition], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf).
6. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Petition to Require Public Companies to
Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM. (2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (last visited Aug. 22,
2014).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q-1(b)(8) (West 2014) (authorizing the SEC to adopt “such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors”).
8. Comment letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al., to Ms. Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-1198.pdf.
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Such a legal challenge is destined to be heard by the D.C. Circuit,
which examines many federal regulations with an increasingly
9
jaundiced eye. This article addresses the hostility that the D.C. Circuit
may harbor against a new SEC rule requiring greater corporate
transparency in election activities and provides some data that might
assist the SEC in navigating this gauntlet.
Of late, the D.C. Circuit has stuck down new regulations on
numerous grounds, including finding that the SEC did not do a
sufficiently rigorous cost-benefit analysis, that the rule does not foster
market efficiency, or that it somehow conflicts with the First
10
Amendment. If the SEC promulgates a new rule on corporate
political spending, then neither the SEC nor the D.C. Circuit will be
11
writing on a blank slate; both will stake a position in a long-running
12
debate over what types of regulations foster efficient markets. On
9. John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications 26 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 234/2014,
2014) [hereinafter Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396 (“In the seven years after Chamber
of Commerce [v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005)], the D.C. Circuit handed down six more
similar decisions, striking down a range of SEC actions, an average of one per year, representing
one in seven of the SEC’s major rules over that period.”).
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(f) (West 2014) (requiring the SEC to “also consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial
Regulation 14 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 464, Dec. 24, 2013), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/constitutionalgovernance/files/cle_reading-_panel_4.pdf; see also Cass R. Sunstein, & Adrian Vermeule,
Libertarian Administrative Law 1 (June 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460822 (“In recent years, several judges on the nation’s most
important regulatory court—the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit—have given birth to libertarian administrative law, in the form of a series of judge-made
doctrines that are designed to protect private ordering from national regulatory intrusion.”).
11. Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC
Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 704 (2013) (noting that the “history of repeated
invalidations of SEC rulemakings by the D.C. Circuit suggests some degree of distrust of the
SEC’s policymaking judgments”); Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income
Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 463 (1993) (“Most of
the arguments against disclosure, similar to the arguments often raised against proposals that
threaten the status quo, involve the incantation of threadbare and shopworn slogans.”).
12. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political
Change: The Choice between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (examining “the major philosophical schools, [tracing] the evolution in
public policy, and [assessing] some of the principal costs and benefits of regulation and
deregulation”); Robert W. Ingram & Eugene G. Chewning, The Effect of Financial Disclosure
Regulation on Security Market Behavior, 58 ACCT. REV. 562, 563 (1983) (studying the various
views on the disclosure and regulation debate, noting that the “arguments posited as
justification for market regulation . . . include (1) the existence of inadequate incentives to
disclose information, (2) unequal possession of information, and (3) motivation to suppress
unfavorable information in an unregulated environment”); see also Raymond H. Brescia, Trust
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one extreme, laissez-faire purists have argued that all regulations
13
burden the invisible hand of the market and are particularly costly
14
for smaller firms. The solution for a laissez-faire purist would be no
15
regulation of business, not even modest disclosure requirements. But
for others, timely, robust disclosures and other securities regulations
are precisely the reason that the American securities markets are the
16
market of choice for investors around the world. Regulation, in
other words can, if properly designed, produce benefits in the form of

in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361 (2009)
(finding generally, that smart regulation instills trustworthiness among investors and the public
which would increase economic growth).
13. E.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 165 (6th ed. 1790) (“[The
rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life,
which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the
society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”).
14. Frank H. Easterbrook, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 687 (1984) (“Mandatory disclosure rules promulgated by the government are one
means to achieve standardization, but it does not follow that mandatory disclosure is
necessary.”).
15. Lloyd L. Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment
Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2007) (arguing that the
role of the SEC in disclosure rulemaking should be limited because “economic research and
related legal scholarship suggest that there is less need for the SEC to protect investors than
exists in the case of normal consumer protection, where advertising enjoys full status as
commercial speech”); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (arguing that “U.S. issuers have increasingly shunned public
offerings in favor of private offerings to avoid the costs of mandatory disclosure and heightened
liability”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2375 (1998) (“It is difficult to prove what, if any item, among
required disclosures is of less value to investors than items voluntarily disclosed, but the great
variety in content across disclosure regimes—a recent study identified one hundred SEC
disclosure items deemed excessive compared to international standards—suggests that a
number of mandates are not cost effective.”).
16. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1200–07 (1999) (arguing in favor of stronger mandatory
SEC disclosure rules in order to increase corporate social transparency); Jesse M. Fried, Firms
Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 150, 152 (2009) (noting that “that public investors’ wealth
increased substantially when firms were forced to enter the mandatory disclosure system”);
Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 819 (2006)
(arguing further that mandatory disclosure provides more benefits to investors because it
“reduces search and information processing costs for investors by requiring cheap, readily
available, standardized, and relatively reliable disclosure of information”); Edward Rock,
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 686 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he existing SEC disclosure system can be
understood as . . . serv[ing] a standardization function, both with regard to form and quantity of
disclosure, thereby aiding in the comprehension and comparison of different investment
options. . . . Second, it provides a mechanism for the adjustment of reporting obligations over
time. . . . Third, it provides a credible and specialized enforcement mechanism, which warrants
both the comprehensiveness and quality of the information disclosed”).
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17

lower costs of capital for companies. In brief, wise regulation fosters
18
a market that is trustworthy and efficient. The goal is not regulation
for its own sake, but rather to adopt an ideal level of regulation that
provides investors with the optimal level of disclosures and
19
protections at tolerable costs to reporting firms.
The question of whether a new SEC rule requiring political
spending disclosures would be good for the markets is part of the
larger debate over which types of disclosures and other securities
20
regulations help rather than harm the market. This study considers
two recently enacted major securities laws that took divergent
approaches to regulation: (1) The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act, otherwise known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and (2) the Jumpstart Our Business
21
Startups Act (JOBS Act). This study then observes the market’s
reaction based upon stock price movement to each law to test the
17. Richard B. Freeman, Reforming the United States' Economic Model After the Failure of
Unfettered Financial Capitalism, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 685, 695 (2010) (“The end result of the
experiment in deregulation of finance was thus the opposite of what the aficionados of laissez
faire intended. It created a finance sector and real economy more dependent on the government
than before. It raised suspicions about competence and honesty not only in banking but in
business in general.”); David Brodwin, The Good Side of Federal Regulations, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economicintelligence/2012/03/08/the-good-side-of-federal-regulations (“As has been argued by leading
business experts for years, thoughtful regulation can reduce waste, boost output, and even
create jobs.”).
18. Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities under the Securities Laws:
The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1093, 1129 (1993) (“By requiring disclosure and punishing disclosure violations and other
securities-related wrongdoing, securities laws promote the public’s interest in the accuracy of
securities prices and the general integrity of securities markets.”); Amy Deen Westbrook,
Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under
the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 75 (2011) (“The U.S. federal securities laws have
been held up as a model of disclosure-based regulation, of a flexible and effective way to
discipline a market and protect investors.”).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(f) (West 2014).
20. Freeman, supra note 17, at 691 (“Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, warned that the lack of transparency, excess of leverage, and absence of
sufficient prudential controls in over-the-counter derivatives posed a danger to U.S. financial
markets.” (citing Brooksley Born, Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Remarks at Chicago Kent-IIT Commodities Law Institute: The Lessons of Long-Term Capital
Management L.P. (Oct. 15, 1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn37.htm.)).
21. Stacie K. Townsend, The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Takes the Bite Out of
Sarbanes-Oxley: Adding Corporate Governance to the Discussion, 99 IOWA L. REV. 893, 896
(2014) (“[T]he general motivations behind SOX were investor protection and corporate
governance. In 2012, following the recession caused by the global financial crisis, Congress
passed the JOBS Act. Thus, Congress’s general motivation behind the JOBS Act was to spur
economic activity.”).
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broad question of whether the market prefers or opposes more
disclosure.
While there will be distinctions between some of the financial
disclosures required by the above laws and those disclosures that
would be contained in a new rule on political spending, we do not
believe such distinctions are so significant as to derail a meaningful
analysis. If the market has a positive reaction to increased financial
disclosures or, conversely, a negative reaction to the relaxation of
financial disclosures, then it would stand to reason that the market
would have a similar reaction to disclosures of corporate political
22
spending.
This article first discusses the lack of an SEC rule on corporate
political spending and argues that such a rule is needed in light of the
Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. It then explains the D.C.
Circuit’s requirements of a cost-benefit analysis during the rule
23
making process for federal administrative agencies like the SEC. It
introduces data on the market’s reaction to SOX and to the JOBS
Act, which shows that the market reacted positively to SOX and
24
negatively to the JOBS Act. In short, the data demonstrates that the
25
market values transparency and distrusts opaqueness. The D.C.
22. See Gary F. Goldring, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of
Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1528–29 (1981) (“Corporate disclosure . . .
improves informational efficiency because investors and the general market have more relevant
information to incorporate into security prices. This, in turn, increases allocational efficiency.”).
23. Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“Without such a cost-benefit analysis, accounting for benefits as well as costs, we do not
understand how the remainder of the agency’s explanation, all of which focuses solely on the
costs of the rule, could pass muster in this court on petition for review.”).
24. Additionally, in the case of SOX, the increase in market value for a median S&P 500
firm is about 80 times the increase in auditing expenses, the most cited costs of implementing
the new disclosure rules. See Kathy Fogel, Rwan El-Khatib, Nancy Chun Feng, & Ciara TorresSpelliscy, The Market Reaction to Disclosure Rules, RES. ACCT. REG. (under review).
25. To test the robustness of our findings, we included three variables that reflect the
strength of corporate governance in the regressions. The first variable was a dummy that sets to
one if the majority of the firm’s directors satisfies the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or
NASDAQ listing requirements’ definition of independent directors. See Michael S. Weisbach,
Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 446–47 (1988). The next was the
logarithm of board size, the number of directors serving on the board. David Yermack, Higher
Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 197
(1996). The third was the Entrenchment Index developed by Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., What
Matters in Corporate Governance? 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009), an index ranging from
zero to six, with one point for each of the six provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws
including the inclusion of staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachute, and supermajority
requirements for amendments to the charter, bylaws, and mergers. Taken together, the
governance variables do not appear to associate with excess returns due to the SOX or JOBS
Act that we found elsewhere in this article.
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Circuit should consider these results when it is eventually called upon
to determine whether corporate political transparency regulations are
allowable.
I. LACK OF AN SEC RULE ON POLITICAL SPENDING
While the SEC requires public firms to divulge many details of
their financial health, corporate governance structures, and
outstanding liabilities, it does not require public firms to inform
26
investors about their political spending. Before 2010, not having such
a disclosure rule made a certain amount of sense, as corporate
political spending was generally barred in federal elections and in
27
nearly half of state elections.
The absence of an SEC political spending rule post-Citizens
United, however, is not an indication of shareholders’ lack of desire
28
for such a rule. To the contrary, shareholders have launched several
26. John C. Coates, IV, SEC’s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a
Policy and Political Mistake, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 13,
2013 at 8:51 AM) [hereinafter Coates, Non-Decision], https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-andpolitical-mistake/ (arguing that the SEC’s decision to remove disclosure of political activities
from its agenda “is a policy mistake, as it ignores the best research on the point . . . and
perpetuates a key loophole in the investor-relevant disclosure rules, allowing large companies to
omit material information about the politically inflected risks they run with other people’s
money”). Coates also argues it is a political mistake “as it repudiates the 600,000+ investors who
have written to the SEC personally to ask it to adopt a rule requiring such disclosure, and will
let entrenched business interests focus their lobbying solely on watering down regulation . . .
rather than having also to work to influence a disclosure regime.” Id; Dina El Boghdady, SEC
Drops Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending from its Priority List, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-drops-disclosure-ofcorporate-political-spending-from-its-priority-list/2013/11/30/f2e92166-5a07-11e3-8304caf30787c0a9_story.html.
27. Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2011),
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (“While the ruling does not directly affect state laws,
there are 24 states that currently prohibit or restrict corporate and/or union spending on
candidate elections.”); but see Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency
Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (indicating that even before Citizens
United, corporations were a source of funds for campaigns and that executives would donate
money and receive money in back in the form of “bonuses”).
28. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 2, at 937 (“[P]ublic companies spend significant
amounts of shareholder money on politics, and the levels and recipients of the spending are not
transparent to investors . . . in response, shareholders have increasingly expressed strong
interest in receiving information on political spending from the companies they own.”);
Christopher P. Skroupa, Investors Want Disclosure of Corporate Political Contributions and
(Apr.
20,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
Lobbying
Expenditures,
FORBES
christopherskroupa/2012/04/20/investors-want-disclosure-of-corporate-political-contributionsand-lobbying-expenditures-2/ (“A 2011 Si2 study found that S&P 500 companies spent a total of
$1.1 billion on 2010 political contributions. Of this figure, 87% or $973 million went to federal
lobbying expenditure. Note this figure does not include corporate lobbying expenditures for
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campaigns to bring corporate political spending out of the shadows.
30
Some campaigns have targeted individual firms, while others have
been aimed at the SEC, urging it to require uniform disclosure for all
31
public companies. At four firms in 2014, the majority of shareholders
32
voted for transparency. Several corporations have responded
33
34
positively to these campaigns, even though the SEC has not. As a
result, there is a mix of private ordering, with some corporations

state and local governments . . . .”).
29. Eleanor Bloxham, What’s Behind All the Corporate Secrecy over Political Spending?,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 9, 2013 1:13 PM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/01/09/
corporations-dark-money-qualcomm/ (“Qualcomm has a very low 2012 score on the CPAZicklin Index of corporate political disclosure and accountability, with a zero in all disclosure
categories except one.”); Nicholas Confessore, State Comptroller Sues Qualcomm for Data
About Its Political Contributions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
01/04/nyregion/new-york-comptroller-sues-qualcomm-for-data-on-political-giving.html?_r=1&
(explaining the general lawsuit but without mentioning the records and book-keeping issue).
30. Bank of Am. Corp. SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 71855 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/trilliumassetstephen022912-14a8.pdf
(allowing shareholders at Bank of America to file a shareholder proposal regarding the
company’s political spending); Home Depot Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 291324
(Mar.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf (allowing shareholders at Home Depot to file a
shareholder proposal regarding the company’s political spending); Comment Letter to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, from Heidi Welsh, Exec. Dir.,
Sustainable Inv. Inst., (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/46371149.pdf) (“Investors filed 282 shareholder resolutions about corporate political spending from
2010 to 2012. These proposals accounted for 41 percent of all votes on social and environmental
issues in 2012. . . . The vast majority (79 percent) asked companies to disclose more about
spending before and after elections.”).
31. Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note at 5; see also Petition for Rulemaking No. 4593, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, from James Evan Dallas (Jan.
22, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-593.pdf (seeking a
“Rulemaking in Reaction to Citizens United”).
32. Shareholder majorities endorsed proposals at Lorillard, Valero Energy, and Sallie
Mae—where a majority voted for disclosure of lobbying expenses—and at Dean Foods—where
a majority voted for disclosure of campaign spending. See Sara Murphy, What Companies Don't
Want You to Know About the Millions They Spend, MOTLEY FOOL (July 13, 2014),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/07/13/what-companies-dont-want-you-to-knowabout-the-mil.aspx; Heidi Welsh, U.S. Shareholder Proposals Filed on Corporate Political
INVS.
INST.
(July
2,
2014),
Activity,
2010–2014,
SUSTAINABLE
https://si2news.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/corporate-political-activity-shareholder-proposals2010-2014-as-of-7-2-14.pdf.
33. CTR FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE: HOW LEADING COMPANIES ARE
STRENGTHENING THEIR POLITICAL SPENDING POLICIES 12 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/8047 (illustrating
the 2013 top five ranking companies for disclosure and accountability).
34. Andy Kroll, The SEC Won't Force Corporations to Disclose Their Political Spending
(Yet), MOTHER JONES (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/12/sec-corporatepolitical-disclosure-mary-jo-white (noting corporate disclosure is on the SEC’s “backburner” for
2014).
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disclosing their political spending while others do not. The SEC
should intervene to make disclosures uniform for all public
36
corporations. Although uniformity could also come from Congress,
the SEC has the advantage of being able to act on disclosure more
37
quickly than Congress.
II. CONTEXT: DARK MONEY AND THE NEED FOR A POST-CITIZENS
UNITED RULE FROM THE SEC
Had the SEC required corporations to disclose political spending
pre-2010, there would have been little to report. Corporations were
generally forbidden from participating in elections using general
corporate treasury funds. Rather corporations could participate
through affiliated political action committees (PACs) that raised their
own funds from shareholders and others associated with the
corporation. That all changed with the Supreme Court’s decision in
38
Citizens United v. FEC.

35. See HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL
EXPENDITURES: 2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959566, where the authors comment:
[O]versight and transparency about spending policies have increased substantially, as
boards appear to be responding to intense pressures from investors as well as the
changed regulatory landscape since Citizens United. But disclosure of what companies
spend remains inconsistent—particularly when it comes to indirect spending through
trade associations and other politically active non-profit groups.
Id. at 14; see also Bruce Freed & Karl Sandstrom, SEC Should Force Companies to Disclose
their Political Spending, REUTERS (June 24, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/24/sec-should-force-companies-to-disclose-their-political-spending/ (“For the
fourth year in a row . . . [investors have] backed political disclosure proposals . . . . The number
of resolutions has held steady for the past several years. Public polls have shown that disclosure
is supported overwhelmingly by shareholders, directors and the public at large.”).
36. See, e.g., Shareholder Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1734, 113th Cong. (2013);
Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act, S.
1360, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010).
37. Michael Megaris, The SEC and Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Spending by
Publicly Traded Companies, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 432, 441 (2013) (“Given the inherent
difficulties found in passing any form of legislation in Congress, and with the defeat of the
[Shareholder Protection Act] and [the] DISCLOSE Act specifically in mind, the SEC is clearly
best situated to adopt a policy concerning mandatory disclosure of political spending to
shareholders, particularly when compared to Congress.”).
38. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Reform, Requiring
Corporations to Disclose Political Spending, Sought from SEC, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/citizens-united-reform-corporations-politicalspending-sec_n_1380094.html (“The event in front of SEC headquarters continued efforts by
reform groups and elected officials to fix disclosure loopholes opened and expanded by the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United.”).
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Much to the chagrin of those who believe corporate spending in
39
elections could lead to political corruption, in 2010 the Supreme
Court built on precedent that created corporate political speech rights
40
in ballot initiatives. In Citizens United the Court allowed
corporations (and unions, by implication) to spend their treasury
funds on political advertisements in local, state, and federal candidate
41
elections. This grant of a new constitutional right for public
corporations to spend in elections is a potentially compelling reason
why the SEC should require disclosure of corporate political
42
spending.
The SEC would be on firm constitutional ground in requiring
increased political spending disclosure by public corporations. Indeed,
in Citizens United the Supreme Court presumed that the new
43
corporate political spending would be transparent. Writing for the
39. Brief for Retired Justices of the Montana Supreme Court, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 7, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No.
11-1179), 2012 WL 1829056 at *7 (“The surge in spending in judicial elections has already had a
profound and detrimental impact on the public's confidence in the integrity and independence
of state judicial systems.”); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Montana Foundation as
Amicus Curiae in support of Defendants-Appellants 3, W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Atty. Gen.
Mont., 363 Mont. 220 (2012) (No. DA 11-0081) (“Corporate corruption of the electoral process
can take many forms, limited only by the ingenuity of those attempting to corrupt the
process.”); Julian Brookes, Lawrence Lessig on How Money Corrupts Congress - and How to
Stop It, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/nationalaffairs/lawrence-lessig-on-how-money-corrupts-congress-and-how-to-stop-it-20111005 (“It also
leads Americans to believe that Congress is just bought . . . which makes them cynical and less
engaged, and therefore leaves the fox guarding the hen house.’”).
40. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (allowing corporations
to spend on ballot initiatives).
41. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies
limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
800, 802 (2012) (noting “[a]fter the decision, campaign finance law leaves unions and
corporations equally unconstrained and free to use their general treasuries to fund federal
electoral expenditures”). This was similar to the Court’s approach in Bellotti, where the Court
stated that the Constitution protects corporations except for “[c]ertain ‘purely personal’
guarantees.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Over the years, the limitations on corporate political
spending have been modified in a number of ways, as Congress responded to changes in the
American economy and political practices that threatened to displace the commonweal.”).
42. Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political
Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 443 (2012) (“[W]ith
Citizens United v. FEC, the United States Supreme Court vastly expanded the First
Amendment rights of corporations to engage in political spending.”).
43. Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 997 (2011) (“Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion effectively linked up electoral integrity and voter information by suggesting
an overarching public interest in being able to monitor and understand the workings of the
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majority, Justice Kennedy noted:
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures
can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed
to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether
their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s
interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected
44
officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.

The Supreme Court has been clear that disclosing the sources of
45
political spending is allowed. A new SEC rule revealing corporate
political spending at its source is necessary to give meaning to the
46
Court’s holding. Absent such regulatory action, the money is likely
to remain in the shadows. Indeed, despite the clear message from the
47
Supreme Court that disclosure is perfectly constitutional, the 2010
and 2012 federal elections were marred with hundreds of millions of
48
dollars of untraceable funds known colloquially as “dark money.”
political process.”); Richard Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J. L. & POL. 557 (2012).
44. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
45. E.g., id. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political speech through
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”).
46. Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 7 (“Because the Commission’s current
rules do not require public companies to give shareholders detailed information on corporate
spending on politics, shareholders cannot play the role the Court described.”).
47. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (“The Court has explained that disclosure is a less
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech . . . . And the Court has
upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no
power to ban lobbying itself.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of
Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1057, 1079 (2011) (“Citizens United gave a full-throated endorsement of disclosure
based on both the voters’ informational interest as well as, in the case of corporations, the
shareholders’ interest in holding corporations accountable for their political spending. The
Supreme Court also upheld disclosure information about ballot measure petition signatories in
Doe v. Reed in 2010.”).
48. Brief for U.S. Representatives Robert Brady, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 3, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), (No. 11-1179),
2012 WL 1829057 at *3 (“Citizens and shareholders are too often unable to see, as the Court put
it, ‘whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests,’’ and are thus
unable ‘to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters.’” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.));
Justice James C. Nelson (Ret.), Justice at Risk: Montana’s Fight For Impartial Courts,
Constitution Day Speech delivered at the University of Montana School of Law 3 (Sept. 17,
2013), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Judicial%20Independence%20Speech%
20Sept%20%2017%202013.pdf (“Citizens United ushered in the unprecedented use of dark,
individual and institutional mega-money to influence elections and, effectively, to silence the
voices of individual small contributors and ordinary voters.”); see also MIMI MURRAY DIGBY
MARZIANI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MONEY IN POLITICS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED:
TROUBLING
TRENDS
&
POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS,
(2012),
available
at
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Although this dark money was not entirely corporate, corporations
49
are surely a source of some dark money.
How was some corporate spending able to remain “dark?” In a
nutshell, corporations are still legally banned from giving directly to
50
candidates for federal office in the United States. Instead,
corporations have two major avenues for political engagement in
American elections: (1) through the corporation’s own corporate
PAC, funded by voluntary contributions of up to $5,000 by employees
51
and other persons affiliated with the corporation; or (2) through the
use of corporate treasury funds to buy political ads to support or
52
oppose political candidates. If the corporation does not wish to
spend openly on political ads (for example, Exxon produces and airs
an ad urging voters to vote for a particular candidate for president),
then the corporation can spend through an intermediary to mask its
53
involvement in the ad’s production and funding. Typically, the
intermediary is a nonprofit organized under §501(c)(4) or §501(c)(6)
54
of the Internal Revenue Code. These nonprofit organizations do not

http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/money-politics-after-citizens-united-troubling-trendspossible-solutions.
49. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play: A Model
Explaining Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 361, 394 (2013).
50. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320 (“Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using
general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in
connection with certain qualified federal elections.”).
51. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he $5,000
limitation on the amount that persons may contribute to multicandidate political committees
violates neither the First nor the Fifth Amendment.”).
52. Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance Laws: Rolling
Back Gains Made Under the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 13
ELECTION L.J. 45, 56–57 (2014) (“[C]orporations (and, by implication, labor unions) [were]
given First Amendment rights to spend unlimited corporate treasury funds in federal, state, and
judicial elections.”).
53. Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011) (“Given the anecdotal evidence that many business corporations
interested in electoral activity are reluctant to do so directly and publicly and prefer to channel
their money through intermediary organizations, nonprofit (c)(4)s and (c)(6)s in the postCitizens United regime play a key role as vehicles for collecting, pooling, and spending business
corporation funds to influence elections.”).
54. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4) (West 2014) (“Civic leagues or organizations not organized for
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or
persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to
charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”); § 501(c)(6) (“Business leagues, chambers of
commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not
administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the
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have to disclose their underlying donors to the public under most
55
circumstances.
Hence, when a corporation spends through an opaque and
politically active nonprofit, the public viewing the ad cannot discern
56
the true source of the money. Consequently, voters and shareholders
57
alike are left wondering who is paying for political ads. Many voters
would like to know who is backing or attacking a candidate for
58
office. Likewise, many investors want to know whether their
59
corporations are wasting material resources on politics. Despite

net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”).
55. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and
Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 59, 92 (2011) [hereinafter Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding
Behind the Tax Code] (“Much of this undisclosed spending was done through 501(c)(4)s and
501(c)(6)s.”); Briffault, supra note 53, at 338 (“[M]ultiple individuals, multiple corporations, or
multiple corporations and individuals may, without monetary limit, pool their funds in nonprofit
organizations that finance independent expenditures—and, of course, those independent
expenditures may not be subject to a monetary limit either.”).
56. PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON ELECTIONS
AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 12 (2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-United-20110113.pdf (finding “[g]roups that did not
provide any information about their sources of money collectively spent $135.6 million, 46.1
percent of the total spent by outside groups during the [2010] election cycle.”); BLAIR BOWIE &
ADAM LIOZ, DEMOS, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF
MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 5 (2013), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/
files/publications/BillionDollar Democracy_Demos.pdf (“For the 2012 election cycle, 31% of all
reported outside spending was ‘secret spending,’ coming from organizations that are not
required to disclose the original source of their funds.”).
57. Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin
Center For Business Ethics Research as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 13, Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349016 at *13 [hereinafter Zicklin
Center Amicus Brief] (responding to the appellant’s brief noting “shareholders can exercise
their important oversight function only if they are aware of the corporation’s political activities.
Eliminating disclosure requirements is tantamount to asking shareholders to conduct oversight
while blindfolded”).
58. See Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate
Political Spending and Support for Common Sense Reform, DEMOS (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/citizens-actually-united-bi-partisan-opposition-corporatepolitical-spending-and-support (citing a 2012 poll by Bannon showing that 81 percent of
Americans agree that companies should only spend money on political campaigns if they
disclose their spending immediately.).
59. For a discussion of the shareholder rights implicated by Citizens United, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 83, 84 (2010) (arguing for rules that “mandate detailed and robust disclosure to
shareholders of the amounts and beneficiaries of a corporation’s political spending, whether
made directly by the company or indirectly through intermediaries”); Paul S. Miller,
Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J.L. & POL.
51, 53 (2012) (arguing that shareholders’ association rights justify limiting corporate political
activities); CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN
SPENDING, GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A
VOICE,
21–23
(2010),
available
at
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these concurrent broad social interests, the corporate, tax, and
campaign finance laws and regulations have largely lagged behind the
post-2010 ability of corporations to spend in politics, frustrating
60
investors who seek this basic knowledge. For example, at the time of
this writing, four years after Citizens United, Congress has failed to
61
pass a single piece of legislation to address the decision; nor has the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) promulgated a single Citizens
62
United regulation on disclosure.
Further compounding the problem, 2010 witnessed the advent of
new forceful players on the political battlefield: Super PACs. Super
PACs are entities that can aggregate unlimited money from unlimited
63
sources, so long as they exclude money from foreign nationals. Super
PACs arose out of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v.
64
FEC, which relied heavily on the reasoning in Citizens United. In the
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/shareholdersvoice2_5_10.pd
f (arguing for shareholder disclosure and consent); Taub, supra note 42, at 450 (proposing that
“disclosure and consent should travel down the full intermediation chain where ultimate
investors can see and sanction or oppose corporate political spending”); Comment Letter from
Jack Bogle, Pres., Bogle Fin. Mkts. Research. Ctr., to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-22.pdf
(“I urge the Commission to stand back for a moment from the issue of full disclosure of
corporate contributions to decide whether corporate shareholders should not first decide
whether a corporation should make any political contribution whatsoever without the approval
of its shareholders.”).
60. Brief for AARP, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Am. Tradition
P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), (No. 11-1179), 2012 WL 1853623 at *13
(“Corporations have clear incentives to avoid disclosure and accountability; federal tax and
campaign finance laws, as well as state campaign finance laws, have accommodated their desire
to do so.”); Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, supra note 55, at 77–86.
61. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 24–25, (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf (noting “a policy question for Congress may be whether the
implications of the current reporting requirements represent ‘loopholes’ that should be closed
or whether existing requirements are sufficient”); but see Jeremy Miller, The DISCLOSE Act,
Yet Again No Profiles in Courage, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASHINGTON
(July 17, 2012), http://www.citizensforethics.org/blog/entry/no-profiles-in-courage-us-senaterejects-disclose-act (noting the multiple failed attempts to pass the DISCLOSE Act—legislation
which would have brought more transparency to political spending post-Citizens United).
62. Shane Goldmacher, Four Years Later, FEC May Finally Update Its Books with
Citizens United Ruling, NAT’L J. (June 8, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/fouryears-later-fec-may-finally-update-its-books-with-em-citizens-united-em-ruling-20140608.
63. ANTHONY CORRADO, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE
PROBLEM OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL FINANCE 7 (2013), available at
http://www.ced.org/pdf/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight_July_2013.pdf, [hereinafter CORRADO, IN PLAIN
SIGHT], (“Intermediary groups can serve as vehicles for masking the actual donors funding
campaign related expenditures. They can function as pass throughs to veil contributions from
public view.”).
64. 599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (holding that an
FEC provision limiting contributions by individuals to political committees that made only

TORRES-SPELLISCY 9.22.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/7/2015 4:35 PM

RUNNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT

149
65

2012 election, Super PACs raised $828,224,595, including at least
66
some dark money. Thus, although Super PACs themselves are
transparent because they are legally required to disclose their donors
to the FEC, there is no requirement that the entities that give to
67
Super PACs be similarly transparent. Thus, dark money from
68
nonprofits may fund otherwise transparent groups. To the extent this
money originates from corporate treasuries, this poses a potential
problem for investors as scholars have strongly contested the utility of
69
this nonmarket strategy.
70
Corporations have many stakeholders.
These include
shareholders, employees, the community, the environment, and even
independent expenditures violated the First Amendment, and organizational and continuous
reporting provisions of FECA did not violate the First Amendment).
65. Super PACs Cycle 2012, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/
pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited, July 8, 2014).
66. Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The Challenges for Existing
Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 329, 337–38 (2012) (discussing Super PACs).
67. GARRETT, supra note 61, at 24–25 (noting “[i]n particular, relationships between super
PACs and possibly related entities, such as 527 and 501(c) organizations, generally cannot be
widely or reliably established based on current reporting requirements[.]”).
68. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4) (West 2014); § 501(c)(6).
69. Michael Hadani, Institutional Ownership Monitoring and Corporate Political Activity:
Governance Implications, 65 J. OF BUS. RES. 944, 948 (2012) (“It was also argued that the largest
institutional investor will likely oppose CPA [Corporate Political Activity], not only given the
covert nature of CPA, but also given the fact that their money may be used for political speech
which they may oppose.”). See also John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and
Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 691 (2012)
[hereinafter Coates, Corporate Politics] (“Without disclosure reforms, the fact and extent of
political activity will remain only partly revealed, with past and prospective investors having to
infer the condition of the corporate patient from superficial and often misleading features, such
as short-term recent stock-price performance, of the kind that lulled investors into thinking that
all was well with Enron and Lehman Brothers until it was too late for them to do anything . . .
.”); see also John Coates, Can Shareholders Save Democracy, Remarks at the Accountability
After
Citizens
United
Symposium
(Apr.
29,
2011),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/accountability_after_citizens_united
(“Citizens
United now means we’ve got a whole new avenue to reinforce the power that corporations have
had already through lobbying and through PAC activity, to expand the influence of those two
others and to have an additional weapon. And so I think this is only going to get worse over
time. I think that shareholders are going to find themselves more and more frequently in
conflict with management over this.”). For further scholarly examples of this debate over the
utility of corporate political spending, see Rajesh Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, & Tracy Wang,
Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?, 14 BUS. & POL., vol. 1, art. 3 (Apr. 2012);
Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Procuring “Justice”?: Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan
Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 109 (2010) (“There is little evidence to suggest
that these executives will be careful, thoughtful, or responsible with the new ability to spend
shareholder funds at their disposal.”).
70. David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to
Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 189, 212 (2011) (proposing “an alteration in the
discourse norms that govern the firm's relationship with different stakeholders”).
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71

governments. Here we suggest that, among a corporation’s
stakeholders, its shareholders should be most concerned with the cost
of corporate political spending and potential new compliance costs
72
that go with it. Shareholders bear the cost of corporate political
73
spending by indirectly subsidizing it through their investments. And
similarly, shareholders would bear the indirect costs of compliance
74
with any new disclosure rules.
On the other hand, shareholders may benefit from disclosure rules
through added transparency and improved internal controls of
political spending once the company implements a system to comply
75
with new rules. Such disclosure should translate to reduced
76
monitoring costs from the shareholder perspective as well.
71. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, S. RAMAKRISHNA VELAMURI, & BRIAN MORIARTY,
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, COMPANY STAKEHOLDER
RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW APPROACH TO CSR 7–10 (2006), available at http://www.corporateethics.org/pdf/csr.pdf (articulating “ten principles of company stakeholder responsibility,”
emphasizing employees, the community, the environment, and governments).
72. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 59, at 97–101 (highlighting the importance of
shareholders with respect to corporate political spending); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a
Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 312 (2011) (arguing that “the empowerment of stakeholder investors
presents the only currently viable means for stakeholders to influence the behavior of the
American public corporation”).
73. Sabina Bunt Thaler, Citizens United and Forced Speech: Why Protecting the Dissenting
Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United v.
FEC, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 591, 622 (2011) (“[S]hareholders are
contributing money to a cause from which they expect to realize some benefit. Consequently,
shareholders are purchasing a stake in a corporation. . . . Corporations then use shareholders’
money to run the business. Therefore, when corporations spend money on political or
ideological electioneering, they are . . . spending their contributor’s money.”).
74. Zicklin Center Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 17 (“The views of [public corporations
and managers] do not mirror those of shareholders and employees, who often represent a
diverse cross-section of the public. Though many individual shareholders and directors vocally
oppose questionable uses of corporate funds, they lack the means to significantly influence
corporate political spending decisions.”).
75. See Coates, Corporate Politics, supra note 40, at 690 (“If Congress, states, or the SEC
adopt rules attempting to give shareholders more information or more authority in the political
sphere, the evidence presented here should help demonstrate that such legislation serves as a
legitimate and compelling purpose separate from the anti-corruption and other purposes that
have traditionally justified campaign finance laws.”).
76. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 738 (2006) (“Mandatory disclosure duties reduce the cost of searching for
information.”); Comment Letter from Dr. Susan Holmberg, Program Dir., Ctr. Popular Econ.,
to Ms. Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. at 8 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-12.pdf (“The expected benefits of mandatory
disclosure of corporate political spending would be substantial. Disclosure would help to
mitigate the moral hazard problems inherent in [corporate political activity] by diminishing the
monitoring costs for shareholders, allowing them to make more informed investment
decisions.”).
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Political spending by corporations heightens the agency problem
inherent between shareholders and managers acting ostensibly on
shareholders’ behalf because current disclosure rules do not allow
shareholders to monitor how corporate managers spend corporate
77
assets on political causes. Harvard Professor John Coates has noted
that publicly-traded corporations’ political spending raises risks for
firms:
At a minimum, it should be clear that political activity creates
distinct and difficult-to-model risks. Dozens of studies . . . support
the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests.
These harms can flow through many channels—from reputational
harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky
acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring
takeovers. To adequately assess those risks, shareholders need
basic, standardized information about political activity—before
investing, and afterwards, to monitor corporate performance and
make informed decisions. Disclosure of such information is
squarely within the SEC’s charge, which has long included
disclosure of information under Rule 14a-8 relating to social and
political issues of general public interest, under executive
compensation disclosure requirements that bear on management
conflicts of interest that would not directly have a material impact
on firm value, and under the FCPA relating to corporate
connections to foreign political officials. Disclosure of political
activity would deliver significant benefits to investors at a low
78
cost.

The Committee for Economic Development (CED), a group of
CEOs and other business executives, agrees with Professor Coates’s
assessment. In a recently released report, the CED concluded
“[p]olitical activity also exposes companies to substantial reputational
and legal risks that endanger enterprise and shareholder value. These
risks are particularly pronounced in the case of contributions made to
third party groups where the donor does not exercise control over the
79
ways that funds are spent.”

77. Id. at 4 (“In the [corporate political activity] context, there is considerable potential for
personal advantages to corporate executives, particularly prestige, a future political career, and
star power . . . or to help political allies . . . .” (citations omitted)).
78. Coates, Non-Decision, supra note 26.
79. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AFTER CITIZENS UNITED: IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
POLITICAL FINANCE 5 (2011), available at http://www.ced.org/pdf/After-Citizens-United.pdf.
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The CED has urged across-the-board transparency for political
spending, regardless of the source, arguing “[a]ny organization that
spends money advocating candidates or paying for other
electioneering activities—whether a political committee, tax-exempt
501(c) organization, or for-profit corporation—should publicly
disclose the sources of the funding used to finance these
80
expenditures.” Another recent study, published by the Mercatus
81
Center, reaches similar conclusions.
Glass Lewis, a leading proxy advisory service, has also noted that
corporate political spending is accompanied by reputational risks.
As the line between candidate ads and issue ads has blurred,
companies that have donated to some of these groups may face
significant reputational risks. While these organizations may be
funded through soft money or may legally not be required to
disclose their donors, questionable actions on behalf of these
groups could cause the release of information regarding their
donors. For example, in November 2012, a Montana judge allowed
the release of the bank records of the Western Tradition
Partnership . . . , a 501(c)(4) organization that had been extensively
82
involved in the recent Montana elections.

Further, the Conference Board’s Committee on Corporate Political
Spending, a business research group, wrote in a 2011 report:
Corporate political contributions are subject to a highly complex
web of federal, state and local laws and regulations. Failure to
comply can lead to costly lawsuits, civil or criminal charges, and
consequent damage to a company’s image and reputation.
Corporate political activities are closely scrutinized by publicinterest groups and the media. As a result, a corporation’s direct or
indirect political spending can put its reputation at risk and could
adversely affect its business if the company takes a controversial
position or supports a candidate who holds positions that are

80. CORRADO, IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra note 63, at 8.
81. Russell Sobel & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, The Relationship Between Political
Connections and the Financial Performance of Industries and Firms 5 (Mercatus Ctr. Working
Paper No. 14-18, 2014), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/relationship-betweenpolitical-connections-and-financial-performance-industries-firms (“We find little evidence to
support the idea that political activity undertaken by corporations leads to improved
performance for firms and their shareholders at both the industry and firm level. We do
however find a robust and significant positive relationship between political activity and
executive compensation.”).
82. COURTENEY KEATINGE & DAVID EATON, POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: A GLASS
LEWIS ISSUE REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a
/GetDocumentAction/i/7544.
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inconsistent with its corporate values or the views of a significant
83
number of its workers, shareholders or customers.

Transparency is necessary so that investors can properly weigh these
84
risks before investing.
III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THE LOOMING OBSTACLE TO A NEW
SEC RULE ON CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING
The open question for policy makers today is how to deal with
85
corporate political spending. Because other academic papers have
dealt with the constitutionality of and various policy questions
86
surrounding disclosure of corporate political spending, this article
addresses the thorny administrative law issue of an agency’s cost87
benefit analysis in light of the D.C. Circuit’s inevitable review. The
cost-benefit calculus for SEC disclosures and other regulations is not
just an economic matter for regulated companies; increasingly it is a
legal matter for the SEC, which is subject to a seemingly endless
88
parade of lawsuits over its rulemaking in the powerful D.C. Circuit.
83. CONF. BD. COMM. ON CORPORATE POL. SPENDING, CORPORATE POLITICAL
SPENDING, POLICIES AND PRACTICES, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 7 (2011), available
at
https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=corporate-political-spendingCommittee-Report---Advance-Copy.pdf&type=subsite; see also Michael Stocker & Matthew
Moehlman, Are Shareholders Happy With Your Company's Political Spending?, CORP.
COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/MediaMentions/0926-2012_CorporateCounsel.pdf (“Corporate political spending may also expose companies to
profit-impairing reputational risks.”).
84. William Alan Nelson, II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of
Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134,
167 (2012) (“Corporations can decrease the risk of facing a shareholder derivative complaint by
improving the transparency of independent political expenditures and improving policies
governing those expenditures. Corporations should have a stated policy for political spending
and also a committee that can monitor the political expenditure program.”).
85. See Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court As Prometheus:
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 553 (2012) (calling on
Congress to “strengthen disclaimer and disclosure requirements”). For various legislative efforts
addressing this question, see Iowa Senate File 2354, signed by Governor Chester Culver, April 8,
2010; MD Elec. Law §§ 13–306 and 307, and the statutes cited supra note 36.
86. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 2, at 954 (highlighting the possibility of First
Amendment consequences for the mandatory disclosure of corporate political spending);
Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 49, at 411 (discussing political corporate spending post-Citizens
United).
87. SUSAN HOLMBERG, ROOSEVELT INST., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL SPENDING DISCLOSURE 1 (2013), available at http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org
/sites/all/files/2013_10_30_Holmberg_Cost_Benefit.pdf (providing “a generalized cost-benefit
analysis of a potential rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that
would require public corporations to disclose corporate political spending”).
88. Brad Plumer, The D.C. Circuit is the Court at the Center of the Filibuster Fight. Here’s
Why it Matters., WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
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The SEC is just one of many regulators that has a claim on
regulating corporate money in politics. Now that corporations can
spend directly on political ads in all American federal and state
elections, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FEC,
the SEC, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have potential
89
jurisdiction. Moreover, a corporation’s spending on state elections
90
implicates state election laws. If corporations use nonprofits as
conduits, states may try to regulate this behavior through their charity
91
bureaus just as New York State did in 2013. For the purposes of this

wonkblog/wp/2013/11/21/the-d-c-circuit-court-was-at-the-center-of-the-filibuster-fight-hereswhy-it-matters/ (“The D.C. Circuit is surprisingly powerful—not least because it rules on
decisions made by federal administrative agencies. If people want to challenge various federal
regulations in court, the cases often end up here.”); Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3 (2006) (“[T]he SEC's use—or lack thereof—of cost-benefit analysis in a
controversial recent rulemaking on the governance of the mutual fund industry shed light on the
issue for perhaps the first time. . . . [I]n a landmark ruling in June 2005, the D.C. Circuit struck
down the regulation because the agency failed to satisfy ‘its statutory obligation to determine as
best it can the economic implications of the rule it has proposed.’” (quoting Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).
89. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC to Propose Rules on Corporate
Political Spending by April 2013, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Jan. 9, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/01/09/sec-to-propose-ruleson-corporate-political-spending-by-april-2013/ (articulating that “[t]he Securities and Exchange
Commission recently updated its entry in the Office of Management and Budget’s Unified
Agenda to indicate that, by April, it plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics”); Jacob Fenton, Political
Advertisers and TV Stations Ignore Disclosure Rules, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/12/18/political-advertisers-and-tv-stations-ignoredisclosure-rules (“The most widely-used disclosure form allows [TV] advertisers to check a box
saying whether the ads are national or local; additional disclosures are only required for
advertisements that are national in scope. The most common response is to leave both boxes
blank.”); Robert Kelner, Is Increased Criminal Enforcement of Election Laws on the Way
Because the FEC and DOJ Are Making Nice-Nice?, INSIDE POL. L. (July 18, 2012),
http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2012/07/18/is-increased-criminal-enforcement-of-electionlaws-on-the-way-because-the-fec-and-doj-are-making-nice-nice/.
90. For an analysis of how state election laws are implicated, see CIARA TORRESSPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
6 (2011), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Disclosure%
20in%20the%20States.pdf (“Before Citizens United, 24 states barred either union or corporate
political expenditures. Citizens United rendered these laws unconstitutional. Consequently,
corporations and unions have a new right to spend in states where they were previously barred.
Therefore, in approximately half of the states, the number of entities that could potentially fund
future political ads has jumped significantly, while transparency is on the wane.”).
91. Susan E. Golden, et al., New York Nonprofit Revitalization Act Signed Into Law,
LLP
&
MINORITY
CORP.
COUNSEL
ASS’N,
(Dec.
20,
2013),
VENABLE
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/282420/Charities+Non-Profits/New+York+Nonprofit+
Revitalization+Act+Signed+into+Law (“Its provisions apply to nonprofits that are incorporated
in New York, but one significant section—related to financial audits and financial reporting to
the state—applies to all nonprofits that are registered in New York for charitable solicitation
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article, we focus on the potential regulatory role of the SEC because it
is the lead regulator of publicly traded corporations in the United
92
States.
93
The D.C. Circuit, as the court responsible for reviewing the rules
promulgated by federal agencies including the SEC, has become
94
increasingly hostile to novel approaches to business regulations. Two
common justifications the D.C. Circuit has given for why a particular
SEC regulation is inappropriate are: (1) that the SEC did not conduct
a sufficient cost-benefit analysis; and (2) that the regulation did not

purposes.”); see also Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Adopts New
Disclosure Requirements for Nonprofits that Engage in Electioneering, (June 5, 2013), available
at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-adopts-new-disclosure-requirementsnonprofits-engage-electioneering (“Effective today, nonprofits that are registered with the state
will now be required to report the percentage of their expenditures that go to federal, state and
local electioneering. Groups that spend at least $10,000 to influence state and local elections in
New York will be required to file itemized schedules of expenses and contributions.”); see also,
Annual Disclosure of Electioneering Activities by Non-501(c)(3) Registrants, N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13 § 91.6 (West 2014).
92. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited July 9, 2014); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2014 (Feb. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540822127#.U71kNJRdXrS.
93. Jess Bravin, Why D.C. Circuit, at Center of Nominee Fight, Is So Important, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304607
104579210383151449004 (“The [D.C. Circuit] appeals court has shaped enforcement of
environmental, consumer-protection and antitrust law, and is likely to hear major cases in the
next few years on greenhouse-gas restrictions and post-2008 financial regulation.”).
94. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1154–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (ruling the SEC was
arbitrary and capricious in promulgating Rule 14a–11, requiring public companies to provide
shareholders with information about, and their ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated
candidates for the board of directors, and is vacated); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613
F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that a rule exempted federal annuity contracts issued
by a corporation and subject to regulation by state insurance laws from federal regulation
through the Securities Act of 1933; SEC failed to properly consider the effect of the rule upon
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, rule vacated); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482
F.3d 481, 492–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ruling SEC rule exempting certain broker-dealers from
Investment Advisers Act (IAA), even if they received special compensation exceeds SEC
authority and is vacated); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877–78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that
rule requiring that investors in a hedge fund be counted as clients of the fund's adviser for
purposes of fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption from registration under IAA was invalid as
conflicting with purposes underlying the statute); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d 406, 407
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that SEC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating rule barring
national security exchanges and associations from listing stock of corporations which nullify,
restrict or disparately reduce per share voting rights of common, rule vacated); Am. Bankers
Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ruling SEC rule 3b-9, which requires banks
engaging in securities brokerage business for profit to register as broker-dealers under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is invalid); see also Gordon, supra note 10, at 14 (“the various
recent decisions of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals striking down SEC rules on purported BCA
grounds are far more intelligible on a different principle: the Court’s resistance to the SEC’s
expansion of its rule-making in areas traditionally dominated by state law.”).
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further the SEC’s interest in fostering an efficient market for
95
securities. In an SEC cost-benefit analysis, a regulation’s benefits are
96
intrinsically linked to their effect on the stock market. If the D.C.
Circuit is not satisfied that a robust cost-benefit analysis was
97
performed, or that the rule does not further market efficiency, then
either reason could be used by a panel of the court inclined to
98
invalidate the rule to do so.
The D.C. Circuit’s approach to cost-benefit analysis has been
99
strongly criticized by many academics, including Professor Coates.
Professor Coates wrote, in response to the decision in Business
Roundtable v. SEC that, “[t]he D.C. Circuit presented no evidence
that there is any available scientific technique for the SEC to ‘assess
the economic effects’ of the [SEC’s] rule along the lines that the court

95. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149–53, 1155–56.
96. David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs after the
SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 56 (2005) (“The SEC . . . quantified the
benefits of the Order Protection Rule. It expressed its belief that although the rule’s price
protections of New York Stock Exchange . . . and NASDAQ . . . stocks are ‘difficult to
quantify,’ benefits will be substantial.”); Sherwin, supra note 88, at 47 (“Undoubtedly,
quantification of costs and benefits, where possible, is one of the most crucial aspects of costbenefit analysis.”).
97. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153 (“In weighing the rule’s costs and benefits, however,
the Commission arbitrarily ignored the effect of the final rule upon the total number of election
contests.”).
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (West 2014) (“Whenever . . . the Commission is engaged in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”); Recent Case Commentary, Administrative Law- Corporate Governance
Regulation-D.C. Circuit Finds Sec Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate
Economic Analysis.-Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1088, 1089 (2012) (“The [SEC] explained that Rule 14a-11 would increase corporate
performance and argued that any costs of the rule were a necessary consequence of enforcing
traditional state law rights.”). Cost-benefit analysis is also required of the Office of Management
& Budget (OMB) which must report the costs and benefits of federal regulations to Congress
on an annual basis. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C.A. § 601 app. at 86–91 (West 2014).
99. Fisch, supra note 11, at 712 (“[E]mpirical analysis of proposed rulemaking has obvious
limitations. It is difficult to predict the effect that a new rule will have . . . [E]mpirical analysis
frequently requires regulators to extrapolate from transactions that are not comparable to those
that are contemplated under the proposal. Thus the reliability of empirical evidence… is
questionable.”) (citations omitted); James D. Cox & Benjamin J. C. Baucom, The Emperor Has
No Clothes: Confronting the DC Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority 3 (Mar. 4,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016433 (“What we report
here is that the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its
earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress. Our
conclusion is that it is the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role that is opposed to the one
Congress prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules.”).
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100

seemed to think legally required . . . .” While the D.C. Circuit’s
rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court, the high court is under
no obligation to hear the appeal, and takes a relatively small number
101
of regulatory cases each year. This can leave the D.C. Circuit with
102
the final word on the fates of many administrative rules.
A. The SEC & Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analyses have proven to be the Achilles heel of the
SEC’s regulatory power. The D.C. Circuit pointed to an allegedly
faulty cost-benefit analysis in invalidating a SEC rule in 2005’s
103
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC. As
the court explained:
Uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does not
excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it
can to apprise itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of
the economic consequences of a proposed regulation before it
104
decides whether to adopt the measure.

And the Court has continued to build on this precedent. For
105
example, in 2011’s Business Roundtable decision, the D.C. Circuit
undid the SEC’s Dodd-Frank proxy access rule (which would have
allowed shareholders to nominate directors for inclusion on the
corporate ballot) in part because the Court held that there had not
106
been a robust cost-benefit analysis. Some subsequent economic
100. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9, at 29 (citing Bus.
Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154).
101. Federal Courts and What They Do, FED’L JUDICIAL CTR, http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FCtsWhat.pdf/$file/FCtsWhat.pdf (last visted Aug. 16, 2014) (“Unlike the
U.S. courts of appeals . . . the Supreme Court does not have to hear every case that it is asked to
review.”).
102. Pete Schenkkan, Texas Administrative Law: Trials, Triumphs, and New Challenges, 7
TEX. TECH ADMN. L.J. 287, 341 (2006) (“The administrative law part of the federal court
burden is spread widely around the country, all district judges and all circuits. Only the D.C.
Circuit and D.C. District Courts see more than a pro rata share of administrative law cases . . .
.”).
103. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We
agree with the Chamber, however, that the Commission did violate the APA by failing
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the
conditions and by failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent
chairman condition.”).
104. Id. at 144; see also Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9,
at 7 (citing Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit held that the SEC
acted arbitrarily and capriciously for failing to undertake some effort to quantify the costs of the
mutual fund governance rule changes it had adopted.”).
105. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
106. George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution, 64 FLA. L. REV.
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analysis seems to indicate that the D.C. Circuit was wrong in its
107
assumptions about the costliness of proxy access. But right or wrong,
108
they invalidated the proxy access rule. As Bruce Kraus explains,
“[c]ost-benefit litigation has substantially slowed the pace of financial
109
reform, and new cost-benefit legislation looms.”
Claims of insufficient cost-benefit analysis have been raised in
other recent challenges. In American Petroleum Institute (API) v.
110
SEC, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other plaintiffs sued over
the SEC rule implementing Dodd-Frank section 1504, arguing the
rule was arbitrary and capricious, had a flawed cost-benefit analysis,
111
and violated the First Amendment. This rule would have required
112
extractive industries to report payments to foreign governments.
1633, 1663 (2012) (noting that, though Dodd-Frank gave the SEC authority to require boards to
include shareholder nominations on the issuer’s proxy statement, their rule implementing this
(14a-11) was struck down by the D.C. Circuit for an inadequate cost-benefit analysis); Coates,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9 (citing Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at
1149) (“[A] panel of the D.C. Circuit struck the rule down as ‘arbitrary and capricious’
[because] twenty-five single-spaced pages devoted to cost-benefit and related analyses in the
adopting release was inadequate under the APA and ‘failed . . . adequately to assess the
economic effects of a new rule’”).
107. Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, & Guthan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy
Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable's Challenge, 56 J.L. &
ECON. 127, 157 (2013) (“[W]e find significant negative abnormal returns for companies that
were most vulnerable to shareholder access on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly
delayed proxy access for U.S. public companies. We find directionally similar, but slightly
smaller, results for July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business
Roundtable.”).
108. Recent Case Commentary, Administrative Law–Corporate Governance Regulation–
D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic
Analysis–Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088,
1092 (2012) (“In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit waded into a political fight under the
guise of dispassionate scientific oversight to vacate a proxy access rule produced after years of
open, contentious debate.”).
109. Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for Sec Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
YALE J. ON REG. 289, 342 (2013) (“The SEC’s economic case will be bolstered by an important
econometric study conducted in the wake of the litigation itself. Harvard economists used the
litigation itself as an event study to assess the impact of the rule on stock prices, finding
statistically significant positive effects from the rule.”).
110. 953 F.Supp.2d 5 (D.D.C 2013).
111. Id. at 11. (failing to reach the cost-benefit argument and invalidating the SEC’s rule on
other grounds); id. at 24–25 (finding that a vacatur of the rule was the appropriate remedy
because the rule was invalid; no disruption would occur because of a vacatur as issuers had not
been required to disclose yet under the rule; and the SEC has not proffered an argument against
a vacatur remedy).
112. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Payment
Disclosures by Resource Extraction Issuers Disclosing Payments by Issuers Engaged in
Resource Extraction (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1365171484028#.UsL75_Mo7cs
(“The
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission today adopted rules mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

TORRES-SPELLISCY 9.22.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/7/2015 4:35 PM

RUNNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT

159

Notably, in API, the D.C. district court held, “[a]s the Supreme Court
113
has recognized, ‘no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.’”
After the D.C. Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction, the district
114
court invalidated the extractive industries reporting requirements.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis also arose in the D.C. Circuit’s
handling of a challenge to the SEC’s Dodd-Frank conflict mineral
115
mining disclosure rule, which requires listed firms to inform the
public whether their products contain conflict minerals from the
116
Democratic Republic of Congo and surrounding countries. The
Court upheld the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis finding that doing a
thoughtful analysis was particularly challenging in this circumstance:
An agency is not required “to measure the immeasurable,” and
need not conduct a “rigorous, quantitative economic analysis”
unless the statute explicitly directs it to do so. Here, the rule’s
benefits would occur half-a-world away in the midst of an opaque
conflict about which little reliable information exists, and concern
a subject about which the Commission has no particular expertise.
Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes
prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so would be
pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—
117
would create an apples-to-bricks comparison.

In this case, the D.C. Circuit made a more judicious application of
cost-benefit analysis requirement, but only time will tell whether the
more forgiving conflict minerals approach to cost-benefit will become
118
the majority rule in the Circuit.
Consumer Protection Act requiring resource extraction issuers to disclose certain payments
made to the U.S. government or foreign governments.”).
113. Am. Petrol. Inst., 953 F.Supp.2d at 21–22 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.
522, 525–26 (1987).
114. Id. The SEC decided not to appeal the decision. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Won't Appeal
Ruling vs Disclosing Payments Abroad, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/09/03/us-sec-resource-extraction-dUSBRE9820Z820130903.
115. 77 Fed. Reg. 56, 274, 56, 277–78 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 24012p-1,
249b.400).
116. Nat’l Assoc’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 368–69 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Appellee
challenged that the Conflict Minerals rule was arbitrary and capricious because the SEC’s costbenefit analysis failed to determine whether the rule would achieve its intended benefits. Id. at
369. The court responded, however, that these benefits were largely qualitative and
immeasurable and that the agency was not required do the “impossible.” Id. at 370 (quoting Inv.
Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Despite data
that did not lend itself to a CBA, the court nevertheless found the SEC’s analysis valid because
it was the best that could be expected and the SEC was required to promulgate the rule. Id. at
369–70.
117. Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
118. Matthew C. Baltay, Dean F. Hanley, & Paul Bork, Federal Appeals Court Largely
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B. APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard in the D.C. Circuit
As a separate issue, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
allows a cause of action when any promulgated rule is “arbitrary and
119
capricious.” The Supreme Court has provided some guidance about
120
what constitutes arbitrary or capricious rulemaking. According to
the Supreme Court’s Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile, to defeat an arbitrary and capricious
challenge, the agency must show that its reasoning in adopting a rule
indicated a “rational connection between the facts found and the
121
choice made.”
The D.C. Circuit applies the APA when analyzing the suitability of
122
rules and regulations from federal administrative agencies. As the
Court recently explained, “[w]e review the analysis under the
statutory standard set by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . . The
APA requires the court to set aside agency action that is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
123
law[.]”
124
In 2010 in American Equity Investment Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, the
D.C. Circuit applied this standard in vacating SEC rule 151A, which
would have regulated indexed annuities as securities rather than
insurance products, holding that the SEC’s consideration of the rule’s
promotion of efficiency, capital formation, and competition was
125
inadequate. Specifically, the SEC argued that this rule would
increase competition and efficiency by introducing “clarity” in an
126
“uncertain area of law.” But the court noted this could be said for

Upholds
Conflict
Minerals
Rules,
Mondaq
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309960/Securities/Federal+Appeals+Court+Largely+Up
holds+Conflict+Minerals+Rules (“[T]he Court . . . decided that the SEC had acted
appropriately under the Administrative Procedures Act in enacting the Rules and that it was
not required to conduct a more detailed cost-benefit analysis than it did.”).
119. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2014).
120. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (“The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”).
121. Id.
122. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9, at 25.
123. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted).
124. 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id.
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any rule adopted by the SEC, and the reasons given for adopting this
127
particular rule were no better than adopting any other rule.
The court held that this defect rendered the SEC’s purported
considerations of other components of the analysis similarly flawed:
“[T]he SEC’s flawed efficiency analysis also renders its capital
formation analysis arbitrary and capricious. The SEC’s conclusion that
rule 151A would promote capital formation was based significantly
on the flawed presumption that the enhanced investor protections
128
under rule 151A would increase market efficiency.”
So whether it is the cost-benefit analysis or the APA’s arbitrary
and capricious standard, the SEC must navigate a potential minefield
of judicial objections to new rules in the D.C. Circuit. To the extent
that the D.C. Circuit’s hostility is motivated by an assumption that
markets are “burdened” by every type of regulation, our data sets
provide empirical evidence to the contrary.
IV. OUR DATASETS
Corporations’ ability to spend in politics post-Citizens United
raises a host of potential corporate governance problems. Because
there is no SEC rule requiring disclosure of such spending to
shareholders, and because a new rule would likely be reviewed by a
hostile D.C. Circuit, there is a clear need for concrete data on the
129
overall effects of disclosure requirements.
Our data help illuminate who has the stronger argument in the
broader debate over whether disclosure, and other securities
regulations, are beneficial to markets. Since there is no present SEC
political disclosure rule, we could not measure direct future
130
compliance costs. Instead, we gauged the market’s reaction to other
127. Id.
128. Id. at 179.
129. James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING
INST. 251, 253 (2013) (“Governance of corporate political activity has become particularly
salient since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, which . . . made possible unlimited corporate contributions to ‘independent
expenditure committees’ that do not contribute to or coordinate their activities with political
candidates.”); Stephen A. Yoder, Legislative Intervention in Corporate Governance Is Not A
Necessary Response to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 10
(2010) (“Citizens United itself involved a narrower definition of corporate governance; the
relationship between a corporation and its shareholders. Specifically, the case raises the issues
of whether shareholders should have a say in how their corporations spend corporate funds in
the political process . . . .”).
130. Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 7–8.
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analogous securities regulations. Specifically, we offer our analysis of
131
the market’s reaction to two divergent approaches to regulation:
one that increased the regulation of listed companies, SOX, and one
that reduced certain regulation of smaller listed companies, the JOBS
132
Act. Through careful examination, our data reinforce the notion
that the market values transparency.
This analysis contributes to the debate in two respects. First, using
the stock market as a central place for market participants to
exchange and aggregate information, we demonstrate what investors
collectively perceive to be the net benefits (orcosts) of enhanced (or
reduced) disclosure requirements. A net positive indicates that the
market welcomes the news of the new rules by assigning higher values
to the securities affected, after considering the costs of
implementation. Second, we believe that market efficiency, defined by
133
Fama and others as how quickly the market incorporates the arrival
134
of new information, or by Tobin as how efficiently the market
131. The SEC has used the event analysis technique to detect security frauds. See Mark
Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases:
Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 572 (1994).
132. Christopher C. Paci, et al., JOBS Act Passes Congress, Heads to White House for
Signature, DLA PIPER (Mar. 28 2012) [hereinafter Paci, JOBS Act], http://www.dlapiper.com/
jobs-act-passes-congress-heads-to-white-house-for-signature/ (“The JOBS Act represents what
is likely the most fundamental set of changes to the federal securities laws since the corporate
governance reforms ushered in by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act nearly a decade ago after the
accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom and other companies.”).
133. See Leighton Vaughan Williams, Information Efficiency in Financial Markets, in
INFORMATION EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL AND BETTING MARKETS 5 (Leighton Vaughan
Williams ed., 2005) (“The concept of information efficiency in a market is contained in the socalled ‘efficient markets hypothesis,’ a standard definition of which . . . [is] ‘the simple statement
that security prices fully reflect all available information.’”); Leighton Vaughan Williams,
Information Efficiency in Betting Markets: A Survey, 51 BULLETIN ECON. RES. 1, 1 (1999);
Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 36 (1965); Eugene F. Fama
et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1969);
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383, 383 (1970); Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider
Trading Activity, 36 J. FIN. 855, 856 (1981) (“The strong-form efficient market hypothesis states
that all relevant information both public and private, is reflected in a security’s market price.”).
134. See generally ANDREW W. LO, MARKET EFFICIENCY: STOCK MARKET BEHAVIOR IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE, vols. I & II, (1997); James Tobin, Sterling Prof. of Econ., Yale Univ.,
On the Efficiency of the Financial System, Fred Hirsch Memorial Lecture (May 15, 1984), in 153
LLOYDS BANK REV. (1984) at 2 (articulating three definitions of “market efficiency”: “first, a
market is 'efficient' if it is on average impossible to gain from trading on the basis of generally
available public information; . . . [a] second and deeper meaning is the following: a market in a
financial asset is efficient if its valuations reflect accurately the future payments to which the
asset gives title;” and “[t]hird, a system of financial markets is efficient if it enables economic
agents to insure for themselves deliveries of goods and services in all future contingencies,
either by surrendering some of their own resources now or by contracting to deliver them in
specified future contingencies”).
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allocates more capital to productive firms (away from unproductive
ones), rests on the availability of information to broad participants in
the stock markets and the quality, especially the trustworthiness, of
135
the information. Information that can only be obtained by a
selected few, or information that is incomplete or murky, on the other
hand, compromises the price discovery and adjustment process, and
136
hurts market efficiency.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
1. SOX Background and Data
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. securities markets
suffered from a fundamental, well-neigh existential, problem—a loss
137
of investor trust.
Major companies were going bankrupt
simultaneously, and the problem was rooted in basic accounting
138
flaws. If a shareholder in a major company, for example, the energy
giant Enron, could not trust the financial statements prepared by it
139
and its “Big Four” accounting firm Arthur Andersen, then who
135. BRENT A. OLSON, 2 PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REG. §
14:10 (3d ed. 2014) (“An efficient market is one in which prices reflect available information.
The Third Circuit has defined an ‘efficient’ market as one where ‘information important to
reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into stock prices.’” (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Lit., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997))).
136. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 745, 798 (2013) (“[L]ess efficient disclosure leads to less efficient stock prices, which in
turn leads to less efficient capital allocation. The bottom line is that disappearing disclosure may
result in less valuable companies and a less valuable economy.”); Fangliang Huang, Price
Discovery, Competition and Market Mechanism Design, 4 ASIAN SOC. SCI., 126 (2008) (“The ill
transfer of information or asymmetry of information will affect the formation of prices. The
uninformed or ill-informed manufacturers or consumers will possibly form mistaken valuation
of goods, which will harm the price discovery efficiency. The distorted price signal will probably
cause incorrectly the tendency of production or consumption. Incomplete information may lead
to two other phenomena, adverse selection and moral hazard, which will make the market less
efficient.”).
137. Elisabeth Bauman, Not Business as Usual, THE NEWS HOUR (Jan. 30, 2002),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june02/enron.html (“The collapse has made
many Americans lose confidence in the stock market. If such a ‘successful’ company abuses the
trust of investors, what's to say other companies aren't doing the same thing?”).
138. Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (July 22, 2003),
http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html (“Sarbanes-Oxley was precipitated
by a slew of corporate scandals, including those at Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global
Crossing and WorldCom.”).
139. The particular failures demonstrated by the actions of Enron and Arthur Andersen are
explained well by Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) (“Sarbanes-Oxley was a measured and appropriate response to the abject
failures in U.S. corporate governance . . . . [T]he corporate governance crisis in America, with
Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both our system of mandatory rules, and of the
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140

could the investing public trust? Failures in corporate governance
141
were at the heart of these corporate scandals. Congress worked
quickly to pass The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act, otherwise known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
in July 2002 to reassure the markets that it was safe for investors to
142
trust the stock market again. SOX was subject to a constitutional
challenge based on the structure of one oversight board—which was
found to be constitutionally flawed—but was otherwise left intact by
143
the federal courts.
SOX was a multi-dimensional piece of legislation that included
reforms in corporate governance, accounting regulations, and SEC
144
reporting. Sections 302 and 906 were particularly noteworthy, which
contracting processes, which, together, constitute the infrastructure of the U.S. corporate
governance system.”).
140. R. Preston McAfee, The Real Lesson of Enron’s Implosion: Market Makers are In the
Trust Business, 1 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE no. 2, art. 3, at ii, (2004) available at
http://www.ovc.edu/advance/hamm/EnronImplosion.pdf (“How did Enron, a •rm worth $60
billion, collapse . . . ? Market makers like Enron and Ebay are in the ‘trust’ business, just as
banks and insurance companies are. Once trust was lost, the rest of Enron’s value quickly
disappeared.”).
141. See, e.g., PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOV’T. AFFAIRS
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S
COLLAPSE, 107TH CONG., S. REP.
NO. 107-70 (Comm. Print 2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT80393/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT80393.pdf.
142. Representative Michael Oxley, one of the Sponsors of SOX, gave this description of
the climate surrounding its passage:
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed during a period in which a majority of Americans had lost
faith in the pillars of corporate life: company executives, public accountants,
investment bankers, stock and bond analysts, and attorneys. This mistrust, I would
point out, was well founded. Too many failed to act ethically. Indeed, we have learned
that many violated criminal laws . . . .
Sarbanes-Oxley: Two Years of Market and Investor Recovery, Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv’s., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley) available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba96550.000/hba96550_0f.htm). SOX is not
without its critics. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (“In the frantic political environment in
which SOX was enacted, legislators adopted proposals of policy entrepreneurs with neither
careful consideration nor assimilation of the literature at odds with the policy prescriptions.”).
143. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3143 (2010)
(“Petitioners argued that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act contravened the separation of powers by
conferring executive power on Board members without subjecting them to Presidential
control.”).
144. Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As Quack Corporate
Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1909 (2007) (“[T]he
strongest empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the executive certification
requirements . . . have provided the capital markets with useful information that has already
improved their efficiency as allocators of capital and should provide increasing benefits in the
future.”); Michael W. Peregrine, Another View: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Legacy of Enron, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK
(Nov.
25,
2011,
10:30
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com
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required chief executive officers and chief financial officers to
personally certify the accuracy of the firm’s financial statements,
where failure to comply subjects corporate officers to civil or criminal
145
penalties.
Additionally, SOX section 404 tried to rebuild public trust by
strengthening the internal controls that underpin the accuracy and
146
reliability of published financial statements. Section 404 sought to
ensure the reliability of the financial reporting process by requiring
every public company that files annual reports with the SEC to report
on management’s responsibilities to establish and maintain adequate
internal controls over the company financial reporting process, as well
147
as management’s assessment of the effectiveness of those controls.
At the same time, section 404 required registered public accountants
148
to attest to those statements.
SOX also created the Public
149
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which can require external
auditors to conduct a report on management’s assessment, as well as
150
on the effectiveness of a company’s controls.

/2011/11/25/another-view-sarbanes-oxley-and-the-legacy-of-enron/?_r=0 (noting that SOX
included: “the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, improving corporate financial
disclosure, establishing new criminal penalties related to obstruction of justice and addressing
conflicts of interest of securities analysts, among other provisions.”).
145. Final Rule: Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,527, 11,528–29
(Mar. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, & 249).
146. KPMG, SARBANES OXLEY SECTION 404: SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM
SUBMISSIONS TO THE SEC 2 (2005), available at http://www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtual_library/
Risk_advisory_services/SarbanesOxley_SEC.pdf (“Section 404 of [SOX] . . . requires companies
that file annual reports with the SEC to report on management’s responsibilities to establish and
maintain adequate internal control over the company’s financial reporting process, as well as
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of those controls.”); see also PROVITIVI, SM.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT EXECUTIVE
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.protiviti.com/enUS/Documents/Resource-Guides/SarbanesOxleyFAQs.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Am. Inst. of CPAs,
http://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/issues/pages/section404bofsox.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2014)
(“Section 404(b) requires a publicly-held company’s auditor to attest to, and report on,
management’s assessment of its internal controls.”).
149. Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010)
(“After a series of celebrated accounting debacles . . . the Act introduced tighter regulation of
the accounting industry under a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. . . .
Congress created the Board as a private ‘nonprofit corporation,’ [that can] recruit its members
and employees from the private sector by paying salaries far above the standard Government
pay scale.”).
150. PUBLIC CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., About the PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/
About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (“[SOX] which created the PCAOB,
required that auditors of U.S. public companies be subject to external and independent
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The primary new cost attributable to SOX was that of section 404
151
audits. Table 1 reports audit fees per million dollars of revenue from
2002 to 2011, and the year-over-year percentage change, as calculated
by Audit Analytics, a firm specializing in audit data collections,
dissemination, and analysis. In 2004, the first year section 404 was
implemented, the data shows an increase of nearly 50 percent in audit
152
fees. After the initial increase, the percentages trend downward in
2006, 2007, and 2008, with an uptick in 2009 (possibly because of
reduced revenue, denominator, in 2009 rather than a increased
153
numerator), followed by a downward trend through 2010 and 2011.
Table 1: Audit Fees (USD) Per Million Dollars in Revenue with Audit Fees
over Revenue Percentage Change from Year to Year (2002–2011)154
Year
Fees/$1m
Change
Year
Fees/$1m
Change

2002
$370
—
2007
$538
-7.13%

2003
$405
9.47%
2008
$533
-0.93%

2004
$590
47.29%
2009
$577
8.41%

2005
$597
0.09%
2010
$505
-12.52%

2006
$579
-2.99%
2011
$466
-7.75%

oversight for the first time in history. Previously, the profession was self-regulated.”).
151. Susan W. Eldridge & Burch T. Kealey, SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation under Section
4042, COMPLIANCE WEEK (June 13, 2005), www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/
OMAHAREPORT.doc.
152. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2002) (“The substantial existing
regulatory framework was breached by aggressive outsiders who seemed determined to ignore
the risks of their actions, including their personal exposure to punishment. Promoting more
independent monitors with lower-powered incentives to scrutinize the actions of highly
informed and motivated insiders cannot solve this problem.”).
MCGRAW
HILL
FIN.,
153. S&P
Capital
IQ,
Compustat
Financials,
https://www.capitaliq.com/home/what-we-offer/information-you-need/financialsvaluation/compustat-financials.aspx (last visited July 9, 2014) (“Academic and quantitative
researchers, hedge funds, and investment professionals around the world use Compustat’s
unrivaled historical fundamental and market data for in-depth historical research and
analysis.”). For the universe of companies covered by the Compustat database, the most
comprehensive financial database on the publicly traded companies in the U.S., the average firm
saw its revenue decline by 6.39 percent and the median, by 9.96 percent.
154. Don Whalen & Mark Cheffers, Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees, A Ten Year Trend,
AUDIT ANALYTICS 11 (2012) (on file with author) (defining audit fees as those related to
“perform the audit or review in accordance with the GAAS [Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards, developed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board of the U.S.],” but
could also include fees related to providing “comfort letters, statutory audits, attest services,
consents and assistance with and review of documents filed with the SEC”).
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155

Calendar
Year

Total
Fees

Total
Revenue
($bn)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

6,259
6,368
8,533
8,851
9,438
9,846
10,121
9,588
9,626
9,936

8,314
9,246
10,498
11,732
13,152
14,611
15,309
13,485
15,141
16,919

Total
Fees as a
% of
Revenue

0.08%
0.07%
0.08%
0.08%
0.07%
0.07%
0.07%
0.07%
0.06%
0.06%

Audit
Fees

NonAudit
Fees

Audit
Fees
per
Firm

NonAudit
Fees
per
Firm

Median
CEO
Compensation

Median
CFO
Compensation

3,073
3,742
6,258
7,000
7,612
7,854
8,153
7,785
7,647
7,883

3,186
2,626
2,276
1,851
1,826
1,991
1,968
1,803
1,980
2,054

1.23
1.49
2.50
2.79
3.04
3.13
3.25
3.11
3.05
3.14

1.27
1.05
0.91
0.74
0.73
0.79
0.79
0.72
0.79
0.82

2.86
2.74
3.26
3.48
3.44
3.55
3.51
3.37
4.26
—

1.00
0.98
1.16
1.16
1.24
1.19
1.18
1.17
1.14
—

To put the SOX audit numbers in perspective, we compared the
costs of audits to the cost of CEO or CFO compensation in Table 2.
Total compensation of the CEOs and CFOs were obtained from the
Compustat-Executive Comp database including salary, bonus, total
values of restricted stock grants and option grants, and the payout of
long-term incentive plans. The median of total CEO or CFO
compensation was then calculated based on the sample of S&P 1500
firms.
In a separate study conducted in 2009, the SEC tallied the total
cost of SOX 404 compliance by surveying firms about the shares of
audit and non-audit fees directly attributable to the compliance rule,
adding in internal labor hours and non-labor costs, as well as outside
156
vendor costs. As opposed to scaling by total revenue in the Audit
Analytic study cited earlier, the SEC’s report showed that, scaled by
total assets, small firms, those with a public share float from $50
million to $150 million, experienced on average, a cost of 0.79 percent
of total assets, whereas the cost for large firms, those with over $700
157
million of public float, was 0.14 percent. In addition, the SEC’s
155. Samples include the 2,507 accelerated filers for audit and no-audit fees, and S&P 1500
companies for CEO and CFO compensation figures. Both samples represent the largest publicly
traded companies in the U.S. capital markets and significantly overlap.
156. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM. OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, STUDY OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
42
(2009)
[hereinafter
SEC,
SOX
STUDY],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf.
157. Id. at 53.
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report found that compliance costs move in an inverse direction to
158
years of experience.
Firms with three years of compliance
experience see their costs go down to 0.55 percent for small firms, and
159
0.11 percent for large firms.
2. The Market Reaction to the Adoption of SOX
The implementation of SOX did not happen in a day; rather, its
adoption was a multi-stage event, which gave the market a prolonged
160
time period to react to the new law. Thus we analyzed the adoption
of SOX as a multi-stage event that took twenty-two days from the
time the conference committee reported the legislation to both
161
houses of Congress on July 24, 2002, to when President Bush signed
162
the legislation into law on July 30, 2002, to the first reporting
163
deadline under the new law on August 14, 2002.
Investors reacted positively to SOX and other signs that the
government would step in to discipline perpetrators of corporate
164
fraud. For example, on June 26, 2002, the day that the SEC
announced it was filing a lawsuit against WorldCom for financial
165
reporting fraud, the average stock market price rose by 3.6 percent.
158. Id. at 41–42; see also Townsend, supra note 21, at 904 (“These costs [of audit
compliance] have decreased largely because companies became more knowledgeable about
SOX regulation and more experienced with their internal compliance procedures.”).
159. SEC, SOX STUDY, supra note 156, at 41–42.
160. Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the
Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK L. REV. 429, 451 (2005) (“[SOX was] passed by
a nearly unanimous vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate only seven
months after Enron declared bankruptcy. In the same month [that] it was introduced in both
chambers of Congress, President Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law.”).
161. The joint conference committee of the House and the Senate reported on July 24,
2002. The bill passed the House on July 25, 2002 and the Senate on the same day.
162. Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bills Aimed at
Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/
corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signs-bill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html (“In a sign
of how profoundly the nation’s business scandals and volatile stock market have rocked his
administration, President Bush signed a sweeping corporate-fraud bill today with central
provisions that he opposed just three weeks ago.”).
163. Brian P. Kane, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Something for Everyone to Worry
About, 45 ADVOC. 16 (2002) (“The first reporting deadline passed on August 14, 2002, and
virtually 761 publicly held companies filed their certifications.”).
164. UI Researchers Find Positive Market Reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley Act, UNIV. IOWA
NEWS SERVS. (Feb. 20, 2007), http://news-releases.uiowa.edu/2007/february/022007soxreaction.html (“While corporate executives say their businesses are groaning under the weight
of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, two University of Iowa business professors have
found that most investors cheered the law during its early days.”).
165. Id. (“Stock prices began to rebound almost as soon as the SEC announced its actions
on June 26, as stock returns increased by 3.6 percent by the end of the trading day June 27 from
their lows of the day before.”).
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Similarly, on July 24, 2002, when investors learned that the SarbanesOxley Act was under review by the House and Senate for approval,
166
the market stock value increased by 5.4 percent. On July 29, 2002,
when the SEC stated that it would publicly name CEOs and CFOs
who did not certify their financial statements, stock prices increased
167
by another 5 percent. Overall, stocks of companies that investors
believe were using the most deceitful financial reporting tactics
rebounded the most after the aforementioned announcements, rising
168
on average by an additional 5 percent.
Examining the S&P 1500 firms as our data set, we used an event
study methodology to measure the market reaction surrounding the
169
enactment of SOX on July 30, 2002, when it was signed into law. We
used the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression model with robust
standard errors which allowed us control for confounding factors such
as macroeconomic and industry level shocks as well as specific firm
characteristics. Expected returns are estimated based on the standard
market model: Rit = ai + bi * RMt + et. The left hand side is the stock
return of security i at time t, to be regressed on the return of the
overall market over the same time period, represented by the market
index composed of the largest 1,500 publicly traded companies in the
U.S., with data obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) equally weighted index. The estimated slope
coefficient, bi, or beta, is then used to estimate the expected return of
170
a security using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The
166. Id. at 123 n.aa1 (“The stock price effects . . . on July 24, are positive and highly
significant (Market CAR = 5.4 percent, t = 3.62).”).
167. Id. (“Untabulated results indicate that the positive reaction occurred on July 29, the
day the SEC announced it would publicly identify CEOs and CFOs who failed to certify their
firms’ financial reports (July 29 Sample CAR = 5.3 percent, t = 3.40, with 95.3 percent of firms
having positive returns).”).
168. Morton Pincus, Sonja Rego, & Haidan Li, Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management, 51 J.L. & ECON. 111, 122 n.aa1 (2008)
(“We find positive abnormal returns (3.6 percent marketwide) associated with E2, the event
that spans the opening of trading on June 26 to the close of trading on June 27 and includes the
SEC’s actions against WorldCom and its mandating of CEO/CFO certifications.”).
169. We did not utilize a difference in difference (DID) analysis because DID is not
appropriate in analyzing the effects of regulation on different types of firms because the
assignment of placebo and treatment groups (firms subject to the new disclosure rule or not)
cannot be randomized. For additional critique on this DID see Marianne Bertrand,
Esther Duflo, & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences
Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004). Moreover, using standard event study methodology
sidesteps any concern of endogeneity, since the event of federal disclosure laws being passed (or
repealed) is not considered a direct consequence of a firm’s specific actions.
170. William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 429–30 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and
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regression also contains an intercept, ai, and a residual term, et.
Practically, to estimate the model parameters for each company, we
use a period of 255 days with the last day being the 46th day prior to
the Act’s enactment date. Such estimates provide a calculation of the
expected return of a security, which serves as a baseline figure to
capture the “normal” returns when there is no news. The variables
that we controlled for in the model are (1) a firm size’s (2) a firm’s
research and development expenses, (3) a firm’s profitability, (4) a
firm’s market to book ratio, and (5) a firm’s leverage. In addition, we
included dummies to control for the different industry types based on
the firms’ Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) codes, as
well as dummies to note whether the firm was a small cap firm as
defined by Standard and Poors.
We expect the effect of a surprise, such as the arrival of new
information about a new disclosure law, to be incorporated in the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), stock returns in excess to the
expected returns predicted by the market model. Because we are
interested in both the short term and longer term effects of the
enactment, we calculate CARs over the (-6,+1) and (-6, +15) event
windows. The reason behind our choice of windows is that the
investors knew that the SOX legislation was under review by both
houses of Congress on July 24, 2002, six days before the event date. In
addition, the due date for certifications of financial statements by
CEOs and CFOs at SEC was on August 14, fifteen days after the
event date. Hence, in order to capture the full effect of market
171
reaction surrounding SOX we use the longer windows. Consistent
with previous research on SOX, we found that the S&P 1500 firms on
172
average reacted positively towards the enactment of SOX. The
mean (median) of CARs is 3.3 percent (4.7 percent) and 4.6 percent
(6.7 percent) in the event windows (-6, +1) and (-6, +15) respectively,
and both means and medians are significantly different from zero at
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 13, 13–14 n.2 (1965).
171. For robustness, we used other alternative windows such as (-6, +14), (-7, +1), (-7, +15),
(-7, +14), and the results were very similar.
172. E.g., Pincus et al., supra note 168, at 129–30 (“[T]there are significantly positive
abnormal stock returns associated with subsequent SOX events, including (1) issuance of the
House-Senate Conference Committee's report, which resolved uncertainty about the act's
provisions and revealed that they would include the most demanding reforms Congress had
been considering, and (2) SEC actions signaling rigorous enforcement of the act. These results
are consistent with investors expecting the provisions and enforcement of SOX to have a net
beneficial effect.”).
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the 1 percent level. Note that such returns are in excess to the overall
market including all stocks traded on the New York and American
stock exchanges and NASDAQ, and tracked by the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), per definition of cumulative
abnormal returns. In summary, we found that the market reacted
positively to the adoption of SOX.
The effects are highly significant economically. After controlling
for industry wide factors and firm specific characteristics detailed
above, we found that for an average firm in the S&P 1500 index with a
market capitalization of approximately $7.9 billion, shareholders
received an accumulated elevated valuation of $261 million between
July 24 and July 31, 2002. The gains ballooned to $364 million if we
expand the time window to August 14.
Although the majority of public firms initially opposed the new
SOX requirements, Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, said that
four years after its implementation, companies reported that their
business processes had improved in terms of risk management, the
accuracy of financial information and internal and external data
173
integration. A survey by business consulting firm Protiviti confirms
Cox’s statement, showing that more than two thirds of large firms
have achieved significant or moderate improvements in their internal
control systems—at the same time finding that the cost of compliance
174
remained at manageable levels of $1 million or below.
Another noteworthy piece of evidence for the effectiveness of
175
SOX is the proliferation of similar legislation internationally. Four
173. Reporting on Internal controls of Small Businesses under Section 404 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 110th Cong.
(2007) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chair., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n.) [hereinafter Cox Senate
Testimony], available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts041807cc.htm; see also
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 988 (2003) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is loud, but not
deafening—non-trivial, but not more far-reaching than any reforms since FDR. Since it might
just work, maybe it deserves a B+.”).
174. PROTIVITI INC., BUILDING VALUE IN YOUR SOX COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1, 8 (2013),
available at http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Surveys/2013-SOX-Compliance-SurveyProtiviti.pdf.
175. See, e.g., Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can
It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes
and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
873, 877 (2011) (“Article 43 of China SOX serves a similar purpose as US SOX section 806,
which is to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and thereby encourage more acts of
whistleblowing.”); Yuriko Nagano, Japanese Look to Implement ‘J-SOX’ Rules, COMPLIANCE
WK. (Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3100/japanese-look-to-implementj-sox-rules (“After two years of wrangling, Japan is finally ready to begin imposing its own
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years after SOX, SEC Chairman Cox reported that other developed
markets such as the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Australia, France,
176
and Canada adopted similar reforms. To a lesser extent, SOX also
indirectly improved corporate governance in developing markets like
177
China and Mexico. Investors around the globe cherish more auditor
independence and improved accuracy of financial reports, where
management assesses and certifies the financial report’s quality and
178
completeness.
B. The JOBS Act
1. JOBS Act Background and Data
The motivation for the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (or JOBS Act) by Congress was far different from what
179
motivated the passage of SOX. After the financial collapse in
180
2008, a long lasting global recession stagnated the U.S. and world
tough set of rules about internal controls over financial reporting, modeled after SarbanesOxley in the United States.”); Lewis H. Ferguson, Investor Protection through Audit Oversight,
Speech at California State University 11th Annual SEC Financial Reporting Conference (Sept.
21, 2012), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09212012_FergusonCalState.aspx (“[M]any
other countries began to adopt independent audit supervisory regimes. Today, just 10 years
after the creation of the PCAOB, almost all advanced or emerging market countries have an
independent audit regulator.”).
176. Cox Senate Testimony, supra, note 173.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Steven B. Harris, Summary of Activities of the Investor Working Group of
the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators, presentation at the PCAOB
International
Auditor
Regulatory
Institute
(Nov.
20,
2013),
available
at
http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/11202013_Harris.aspx (indicating what investors from
different parts of the world wanted from audits); Michelle Seth-Langbein & Goh Ee Waye, The
Value of Audit: Views from Retail (Private) Investors: A Research Project Conducted in
Collaboration with the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (SIAS), ASSOC’N OF
CHARTERED CERT. ACCOUNTANTS (July 2011), http://www2.accaglobal.com/pdfs/international/
singapore/VOAPAC (finding that “80% of respondents felt that audited financial statements
were important to them in making investment decisions”).
179. Compare Bumiller, supra note 162 (quoting President George W. Bush, “[n]o
boardroom in America is above or beyond the law”) with Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to
Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/
us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-ease-investing-in-start-ups.html (quoting President Obama, “For
the first time, ordinary Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they
believe in . . .”).
180. There are many theories about what caused the 2008 crash ranging from pay incentives
at individual firms to political corruption. See Supplemental Brief of the Comm. for Econ. Dev.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 16, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365230 at *16 (“There is a widespread perception that corporate
coziness with government officials ‘contributed to the current crisis in the financial system.’”);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT 85 (2011), (“[I] find it impossible to believe that our government would have been this
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economies. The unemployment rate in the U.S. remained high for
183
years after the 2008 financial crash, which put enormous pressure on
184
American policy makers to facilitate job creation. One suggested
solution to spurring job creation was to lessen regulations of various
185
kinds. In particular, the election year enactment of the JOBS Act,
among other changes, reduced certain SEC reporting requirements
for certain classes of companies and allowed for general solicitations
186
for investors in private companies.

stupid had congressmen from both sides of the aisle not been so desperate for the more than $1
billion in campaign contributions given by individuals and groups affiliated with these firms . . .
.”); Andrew. C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 132 (2010) (“Finally,
another criticism has recently surfaced in relation to the concerns about risk-taking, particularly
in the financial sector. Many scholars and policymakers have laid responsibility for the recent
financial crisis at the doorstep of bankers’ pay structures”).
181. Bulent Gokay, The 2008 World Economic Crisis: Global Shifts and Faultlines, GLOBAL
RES., (Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-2008-world-economic-crisis-globalshifts-and-faultlines/12283 (“The last months of 2008 witnessed what is being called the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929–30.”).
182. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey Unemployment Rate 16 years and over from 2003 to 2013, BUREAU OF
LABOR STAT. (July 9, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (showing
unemployment in the U.S. rising in 2008, peaking in 2009 at 10 percent and remaining over 8
percent until late 2012).
183. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, NY REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?pagination=false (“Five years have
passed since the onset of what is sometimes called the Great Recession. While the economy has
slowly improved, there are still millions of Americans leading lives of quiet desperation: without
jobs, without resources, without hope.”).
184. AMY TRAUB, DAVID CALLAHAN, & TAMARA DRAUT, DEMOS, MILLIONS TO THE
MIDDLE 14 BIG IDEAS TO BUILD A STRONG & DIVERSE MIDDLE CLASS 20 (2012), available at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/MillionsToTheMiddle-DemosFinal_0.pdf
(“The [2008] recession merely widened the already growing earnings shortfall: during the
downturn, 60 percent of jobs lost nationwide were middle-income positions, yet most
employment growth since the official end of the recession has been in low-wage occupations.”).
185. Brian Bodine, The JOBS Act: Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Small Businesses,
NAT’L CTR. POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba776 (“One piece of
legislation, the Jumpstart Our Business Act (JOBS Act), was recently passed and signed into
law. It should improve small business access to start-up capital by reducing the burden of some
federal regulations.”).
186. James E. Bitter & Todd B. Skelton, Reforms for Hire: The JOBS Act Legislation, 14
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 13, 31 (2012) (“Perhaps the broadest overhaul of the IPO
process for EGCs [companies with annual revenues of less than $1 billion for its most recent
fiscal year] is effectuated through the JOBS Act’s reduced reporting and disclosure
requirements. These reduced requirements operate during the EGC's five-year ‘transition
period.’”).
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The bipartisan JOBS Act was intended to increase capital
formation, spur the growth of startups and small businesses and
188
create more jobs. A major component of the Act reduces the costs
of going public by providing “emerging growth” companies (ECGs)
with a temporary reprieve from SEC regulations by phasing in certain
regulations over a five-year period (including SOX Section 404,
189
discussed above). Proponents argued that this would allow smaller
companies to go public sooner, which in turn, could lead to more job
190
creation within those companies. In addition, the Act allows
companies offering securities under Regulation D to utilize
191
advertisements or solicitations to reach investors and obtain capital;
187. Dina El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short on Grand Promises, WASH. POST (Mar. 28,
2013), [hereinafter El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short] http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/jobs-act-falls-short-of-grand-promises/2013/03/28/5a660a14-8675-11e2-98a3b3db6b9ac586_story.html (“The legislation was built on the premise that regulation constrains
the growth of small businesses and their potential for explosive job growth—an assertion that
has been hotly debated by economists for decades”).
188. Whether the JOBS Act has succeeded in creating more jobs is beyond the scope of this
paper. Other authors have been skeptical. Id. (“Now, nearly a year after its enactment, major
portions of the act are in limbo, and other parts have failed to measure up to the grandiose jobcreation promises”).
189. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(a)(2) (West 2014) (requiring ECGs to provide only two
years of audited financial statements instead of 3); Lori Schock, Outline of Dodd Frank Act and
9,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
JOBS
Act,
SEC (Jun.
1365171490596#.UtrG7LQo7De (“In terms of disclosure, the Act provides for reduced
requirements for up to five years after the IPO”); James D. Cox, Strengthening Financial
Reporting: An Essay on Expanding the Auditor’s Opinion Letter, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036,
1039–40 (2013) (“In 2012, with the JOBS Act, Congress returned to the topic again and further
reduced the reach of section 404(b) [of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002]. First, and most
directly, the JOBS Act lifts the auditor attestation requirements for emerging growth companies
for five years after going public.”); Townsend, supra note 21, at 895 (“Ten years after SOX’s
enactment, Congress enacted section 103 of the JOBS Act (“section 103”), which removed SOX
section 404(b)’s outsider-audit requirement for essentially all companies. Specifically, through
the JOBS Act, Congress removed SOX section 404(b)’s requirement for 98% of all companies
that have gone public since 1970.”).
190. El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short, supra note 190 (describing SOX as “a grab bag of
ideas cobbled together for greater impact[]” and noting that “it allows private firms to raise
money by advertising to the general public for the first time in decades, raise up to $1 million in
capital from investors via the Internet, and temporarily skirt some of the federal disclosure and
accounting rules as they go public”).
191. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub L. 112–106, § 201(a), 126 Stat 306 (2012)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, Wall Street
Examines Fine Print in a Bill for Start-Ups, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012 8:43 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/wall-st-examines-fine-print-in-a-new-jobs-bill/ (“[T]he
JOBS Act appears to loosen financial communication more broadly. For instance, the bill will
relax rules on how investment firms can market themselves to the public, reversing regulations
that restrict what hedge funds and private equity firms can say publicly about their investment
strategy.”); Paci, JOBS Act Passes, supra note 132 (“[T]he JOBS Act effectively overrides [quiet
period rules] that currently apply to the publication of research reports by underwriters during
specified time periods after public offerings and during the 30-day period extending from 15
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The Act also removes SEC restrictions that prevent “crowd funding”
so entrepreneurs can raise equity capital from a large pool of small
investors who may or may not be considered “accredited” by the
192
SEC; Further, the Act makes it easier for small businesses to go
public by increasing the offering threshold for companies exempted
193
from SEC registration from $5 million to $50 million; removes
barriers to capital formation for small companies by raising the
shareholder registration requirement threshold from 500 to 2,000
194
shareholders;
and last increases the number of shareholders
permitted to invest in a community bank from 500 to 2,000; arguably
195
enabling banks to better deploy their capital.

days prior to and until 15 days after the expiration date of lock-up periods.”); Steven Rattner, A
Sneaky Way to Deregulate, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 3, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/03/03/a-sneaky-way-to-deregulate/ (“[Investment funds] will [now] be able to
advertise—and thereby separate inexpert individuals from their savings. Until now, only a small
percentage of Americans who qualified to invest this way [those making more than
$200,000/year or with more than $1 Million in net worth] did so.”); Ruth Simon & Angus Loten,
Fundraising Rules Murky Despite JOBS Act, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013 8:15 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579194061455051506
(“The
new marketing freedoms are part of the [JOBS] Act of 2012. It ended the 80-year-old ‘general
solicitation’ advertising ban designed to protect investors from get-rich-quick scams, making it
easier for nascent firms to raise capital to grow.”).
192. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(6) (West 2014); Lori Schock, Outline of Dodd Frank Act and
JOBS Act, SEC (Jun. 9, 2012), www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490596#.
UtrG7LQo7De (“Companies cannot crowdfund on their own, but will have to engage an
intermediary that’s registered with the SEC as a broker or funding portal. These intermediaries
will be required to do some vetting of the company seeking funding.”); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking under the Crowdfund Act, 66 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 43, 44 (2013) (“Title III of the JOBS Act, known as the CROWDFUND Act,
authorizes the ‘crowdfunding’ of securities, defined as raising capital online from many
investors, each of whom contributes only a small amount.”).
193. § 77c(b).
194. § 78l(g)(1)(A); House Expected to Vote on Package of Capital Formation Bills This
BUS.
&
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
COUNCIL
(Mar.
6,
2012),
Week,
SMALL
http://www.sbecouncil.org/2012/03/06/house-expected-to-vote-on-package-of-capital-formationbills-this-week/ (“H.R. 2167 removes barriers to capital formation for small companies by
raising the shareholder registration requirement threshold from 500 to 1,000 shareholders.”).
195. § 78l(g)(1)(B); ERNST & YOUNG LLP, TO THE POINT PERSPECTIVE: THE SEC’S
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD,
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/TothePoint_CC0359_DisclosureOverload_4Octob
er2012/$FILE/TothePoint_CC0359_DisclosureOverload_4October2012.pdf (“The [JOBS Act]
requires the SEC to review the public registration requirements in Regulation S-K and report to
Congress on how to make them less burdensome for emerging growth companies (EGCs),
which have less than $1 billion in annual gross revenues.”).
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From an accounting point of view, the JOBS Act allows emerging
companies to follow the SEC’s private company reporting deadlines,
which often allows a longer time to comply with accounting disclosure
196
requirements, rather than those required of public companies.
According to Lori Schock, Director of the Office of Investor
Education and Advocacy for the SEC, an emerging company must
delineate whether it wants to take advantage of this accounting
197
disclosure rule or not. While the JOBS Act was welcomed in some
198
quarters, others worried that the reduced financial disclosures
199
allowed by the JOBS Act could cause serious problems.
2. The Market Reaction to the JOBS Act
We use an event study methodology similar to the one used above
with SOX to measure the market reaction surrounding the enactment
of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012, the day President Obama signed
200
this act into law. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were
196. § 78g(a)(2).
197. Schock, supra note 189 (explaining that the JOBS Act allows “emerging growth
companies” to have the same amount of time to comply with accounting standards as private
companies, rather than the reduced amount of time for compliance generally allowed to public
companies).
198. Townsend, supra note 21, at 902 (“The supporters of section 103 commonly argue that
it will increase job creation, reduce the cost of regulatory compliance, and improve the
competitiveness of the U.S. capital market.”).
199. Benjamin P. Siegel, Title III of The JOBS Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth To
Crowdfund Small Business Capital or Fraudsters' Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777,
797 (2013) (“Crowdfunding requires the use of the general, unsophisticated public to be an
effective means to raise capital. By requiring less issuer disclosures, as compared with those of
registered public offerings, the CROWDFUND Act is essentially reducing the transparency of
crowdfunding issuers.”); Bitter & Skelton, supra note 186 at 31–32 (“A major criticism of the
JOBS Act is that investors in EGCs [firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues] will no
longer be getting an adequate amount of information to enable a comparison with other
potential investments, and the reduced requirement for providing financial data is a prime
example.”); Craig & Protess, supra note 191 (“The new legislation passed through Congress
over the objections of regulators, past and present, who warned of the potential risks to
investors. ‘It is a bad sequel to a bad movie,” said Eliot Spitzer . . . it should be called the Bring
Fraud Back to Wall Street Act’”); Cox, supra note 189, at 1046 (“In a regulatory realm of less to
no paternalism, the touchstone for securities regulation should nonetheless remain the
information needs of investors. As seen in the case of section 404(b), many nonaccelerated filers
voluntarily chose to comply with the internal control requirements.”); ROBERT A. FRIEDEL &
ODIA KAGAN, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, IF THREE’S A CROWD, THOUSANDS ARE . . . AN
INVESTMENT ROUND? JOBS ACT PRESENTS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS 1 (2012), available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/CorpSec032912.pdf
(“[C]ritics of the act, including the [SEC], state securities regulators, institutional investors and
investor protection groups, have expressed concern that the JOBS Act will harm investors by
reducing transparency and investor protection.”); .
200. Landler, supra note 179 (“President Obama . . . signed a bill on Thursday that will roll
back restrictions on the way start-up companies can raise money from individual investors. Mr.
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calculated using a CRSP equally weighted index as the market
portfolio over the one day event window (-1,+1) and five days event
window (-5, +5). On average, the S&P 1500 companies responded
negatively towards the enactment of the JOBS act, with a mean
(median) CARs of -0.1059 percent (-0.0578 percent), and -0.5539
percent (-0.5105 percent) over the one day and five days event
respectively. Although the mean and median of the CARs over the
one day window as well as the mean and median of the CARs over
the five days window are statistically different from zero, the
magnitude of those CARs tend to be small. But since the JOBS Act
201
was particularly directed towards the small firms, we divided the
mean and median CARs based on the firms’ market capitalization to
investigate the market reaction of the Small Cap (SMCAP), Medium
Cap (MIDCAP), and Large Cap (LGCAP) firms around that date.
Looking at the CARs of those different subsamples, we witnessed that
the SMCAP firms were the firms that had a significant negative
market reaction towards the enactment of the JOBS Act. The
mean/median of CARs around the one day event window, and five
days event window was -0.3126 percent (-0.2805 percent), and -0.2401
percent (-1.1732 percent) respectively. All mean and median CARs
for the SMCAP firms were significantly different from zero at the 1
percent levels. Furthermore, when we calculate the difference in
202
means (using the t-test) and difference in medians (using the
203
Wilcoxon rank test) to compare the difference in means/medians
between the SMCAP group and the two other groups (MIDCAP and
LGCAP), we find that the difference in means and medians is
negative and highly significant across those two groups. Thus, the
negative market reaction towards the JOBS Act was driven by the
SMCAP firms, while the MIDCAP and LGCAP firms did not
significantly react to the JOBS Act.
In summary, the results of the event analysis indicates that the
stock market adversely reacted to the news of the signing of JOBS
Act, indicating that at a minimum, the detrimental effects from lax
Obama . . . said the bill known as the JOBS Act… was a ‘potential game changer’ for fledgling
businesses in need of financing.”).
201. Townsend, supra note 21, at 896.
202. GRAPHPAD, t test calculator, http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/ttest1.cfm (last
visited Jul. 9, 2014) (“A t test compares the means of two groups.”).
203. Valerie J. Easton & John H. McColl, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, STATISTICS
GLOSSARY 1.1, http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/nonparametric.html (“The Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test is designed to test a hypothesis about the location (median) of a population
distribution.”).
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disclosure outweighs the benefits of cash savings for small firms. After
controlling for the same industry wide factors and firm specific
characteristics detailed above, we found that for a median publicly
traded small firms with $809 million in market capitalization,
investors estimated an average one-day of loss of $7.9 million due to
204
the enactment of JOBS Act.
CONCLUSION
Again, before the SEC is a pending petition by ten law professors
205
asking for more transparency of corporate political spending. This
transparency is needed in light of the hundreds of millions of dollars
206
of dark money flowing through the political system at present.
When the SEC acts on this petition, they should craft the rule
207
mindfully to survive the D.C. Circuit’s review process. The data
provided here may assist the Commission in crafting and justifying
such a new rule. As explained herein, the issue of the cost-benefit
208
analysis is not merely of interest to economists; this is a key legal
209
question for the SEC as it navigates the D.C. Circuit.
We conclude from our datasets on SOX and the JOBS Act that
there are real benefits for a company that is perceived by the market
as being transparent with functioning internal controls. We surmise
that this will be true of transparency about corporate political
spending as well. However, we will not be able to test that theory until
the SEC acts to bring transparency to corporate political spending.

204. Our conclusions are consistent with a new working paper on the impact of the JOBS
Act. Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman, & Daniel J. Taylor, The JOBS Act and Information
Uncertainty in IPO Firms (Stanford Univ. Grad. School of Bus. Res. Paper No. 14-16, July 1,
2014) (manuscript at 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465927 (“Taken together, the
findings indicate that the JOBS Act’s eased disclosure requirements increased information
uncertainty in IPO firms.”).
205. Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 1.
206. Brief for Walter Dellinger & James Sample as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents’
Opposition to Summary Reversal, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012),
(No. 11-1179), 2012 WL 1853625. (“Notwithstanding this Court's assurance that disclosure
would ‘provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and
elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters . . . corporations spending
money to influence candidate elections have predictably denied shareholders and citizens such
information.”).
207. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 11, at 701 (“The D.C. Circuit's substitution of its policy
judgment for that of the SEC both differs from this traditional deference and poses a threat to
future agency rulemaking efforts . . . .”).
208. See, e.g., Michael Hadani & Douglas A. Schuler, In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive
Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STRAT. MGMT J. 165 (2012).
209. See, e.g., Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations, supra note 9.

